Six months after Asad

Timelines of key events post-December 8th

Jun 12, 2025

Note: This week’s regular newsletter will be out tomorrow. Also, I will be on vacation at the end of the month and will not be publishing issues covering the weeks of June 18 - 24 and June 25 - July 1, apologies for the inconvenience. The newsletter will continue in its regular fashion for the rest of the year, barring any unforeseen circumstances.

With June 8th marking six months since former Syrian president Bashar al-Asad fled the country, I thought it would be a good time to recap the major events that have happened since, relating to the Ahmad al-Shar‘-headed government and the fate of Syria’s north and east.

Below I have created four separate timelines covering events mostly relating to (1) the Syrian interim government, (2) negotiations between Damascus and the SDF, (3) SDF-controlled areas and intra-Kurdish politics, and finally (4) international relations. I had momentarily paused the weekly newsletter in December 2024 so details from that month are a little sparse but the rest is all excerpts directly from This week in northern Syria.

Additionally I’ve also highlighted interviews and other work I’ve published here during the same period.

On December 13th, I published an essay entitled “Post-Asad Syria: the actors at play,” in which I attempted to outline the main issues facing the al-Shar‘-headed government and concerns over its behavior going forward, in addition to highlighting the various armed actors still operating outside the control of Damascus. Some of the questions asked in the excerpt below have been answered, others linger…

The fall of Asad lifts a massive albatross off Syria’s neck, allowing for a future other than indefinitely frozen conflict, Sednaya, sanctions, and pariah statehood. However, enormous questions remain, notably what happens to HTS’s current designation as a terrorist organization by the US, UK, Turkey, the EU, and the UN, in addition to other countries. Given HTS’s post-Jihadist, Islamist ideology there are also a number of very pressing concerns regarding how such will relate issues of democratic representation, legal protections for religious and ethnic minorities, and women’s rights, among others. There’s the dreadful state of the economy across the country, the reliance of millions on international aid, and the increased pressure that desired return of untold numbers of Syrian refugees from abroad will bring. Meanwhile Israel, Syria’s predatory and unrestrained neighbor to the southwest, has escalated its infringement of Syrian sovereignty via a ground incursion in areas adjacent to the occupied Golan Heights and airstrikes targeting military hardware stored at formed regime bases around the country. Then there are the even more immediate questions, pertaining to how Syria is to be unified at the most basic level…
How will HTS approach the SNA, the SDF, and the South when it comes to its stated intention of creating a functioning, centralizing government? While HTS has established its interim government, large parts of the country remain outside its hands. In order to achieve its state formation goals HTS will have to incorporate these actors, either through negotiations and compromise, or by coercion and force, though this could spark broad political antagonism.
The SNA and SIG have a historically hostile relationship with HTS. They are made up of many figures who have gained significant extra-legal power over the years. Furthermore they are empowered via the extensive Turkish support they receive and the deployment of thousands of Turkish soldiers throughout the territory under their control. What role Turkey plays in the process of unifying the rivaling opposition components will be key. That said the SNA and SIG lack strong institutional coherence and it’s feasible that certain SNA factions as well as SIG politicians and SIG-affiliated local councils could defect to HTS/Damascus.
As an outgrowth of the Kurdish movement, securing legal recognition and protection for Syria’s Kurds, as well as guaranteeing the return of Kurds to their homes in areas like Afrin will be key issues for the SDF in any potential negotiation. Some form of regional autonomy will likely be brought up as well though this might be a harder bargain. The continued attacks of the Turkish state and its SNA proxies are likely an incentive to come to some sort of deal with HTS, with whom the SDF currently has a more neutral relationship. In recent weeks both Turkey and various SNA factions have repeatedly voiced their desires to eradicate from Syria “separatism” and “terrorism,” their standard euphemisms for the SDF. Currently there is a temporary ceasefire between the SDF and SNA in effect, demarcated along the Euphrates river, and reportedly facilitated in some capacity via American negotiations with Turkey. However it seems unlikely the US would forcefully stop further Turkish encroachment in these areas far to the west of American military presence, particularly given the current administration’s lame duck status. The SDF might seek to rely on continued US presence to avoid coming to a final agreement but this would be short-sighted.
As for the opposition groups in the South, these are the least unified and institutionalized as they only just re-entered the opposition last week and lack the support of an outside actor. They are also located the furthest from the areas I’ve covered here over the years so I can not speak to the local dynamics there.

Syrian Government

12/08/24: SNA forces entered Manbij after the SDF largely withdrew from the city, though the latter continued to launch infiltration attacks via tunnels over the next several days. Fighting moved to the east, focusing on the Qaraqozak bridge and Tishrin dam, the two local crossing point over the Euphrates.

12/10/24: Muhammad al-Bashir, formerly the Prime Minister of the Salvation Government, is appointed Prime Minister of the Syrian Caretaker Government (SCG) and charged with forming an interim cabinet.

12/11/24: The SCG suspends the Syrian constitution and the People’s Assembly, Syria’s legislative body, for a period of three months.

01/03/25: Newly appointed Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasrah began meeting with different opposition faction leaders “to begin the process of integrating factions into the Ministry of Defense…” The only SNA commander seen at Abu Qasrah’s Jan 03/04 meetings was Abu ‘Arab of Suqour al-Sham Northern Sector, part of the Harakat al-Tahrir wa’l-Bina’ alliance…

01/04/25: Syrian state media outlet SANA announced that the SCG had taken control over the four border crossings with Turkey located in northern Aleppo: al-Hammam in Afrin, Bab al-Salamah in A‘zaz, al-Ra‘i, and Jarabulus. These had previously been controlled to varying degrees by different SNA factions - Harakat al-Tahrir wa’l-Bina’, al-Jabhah al-Shamiyah, Furqat al-Sultan Murad, and al-Furqah al-Tasi‘ah respectively - in the name of the Syrian Interim Government…

01/08/25: For the first time since taking power on December 8th Ahmad al-Shar‘ met with representatives of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces (commonly referred to as the SNC or Etilaf), specifically president Hadi al-Bahrah and Badr Jamous, president of the affiliated Syrian Negotiation Commission… al-Shar‘ reportedly requested the two dissolve Etilaf and reiterated his intention for the future, undated national conference to only include individuals rather than pre-existing institutions and factions…

01/13/25: Governor of Aleppo (and al-Jabhah al-Shamiyah commander) ‘Azzam Gharib met “with the directors of the the northern and eastern Aleppo countryside local councils… Each of these bodies was affiliated with the Syrian Interim Government, however they now appear to have been incorporated into the SCG’s Aleppo Governorate administration…

01/23/25: The SCG’s DMO deployed forces into southeastern al-Raqqah governorate, taking control of several oil and gas fields. The SDF had entered this part of the province in early December following the rapid withering away of the regime, however in a very limited capacity. While rumors initially spread of the DMO taking the region from the SDF by force, it appears the SDF simply withdrew…

01/29/25: the HTS-led Department of Military Operations (DMO) convened the “Victory Conference of the Syrian Revolution” in Damascus, a meeting attended by affiliated and unaffiliated Syrian armed opposition factions. While ‘conference’ implies a consultative endeavor, the snippets of the event publicized via various state media organs instead present HTS and its commander Ahmar al-Shar‘ formalizing their control of the Syrian state, a product of the military offensive they initiated in late November of last year against the Asad regime…

After a speech by interim Foreign Minister As‘ad al-Shaibani, DMO spokesman Hassan ‘Abd al-Ghani addressed the audience with a nine point announcement, declaring:

the victory of the Syrian Revolution, to be marked each year on December 8th,
the cancellation of the 2012 constitution and suspension of all emergency laws,
the dissolving of the People’s Council and all its committees,
the dissolving of the army with intention of rebuilding it,
the dissolving of all security apparatuses and militias of previous regime to be replaced with a new security institution,
the dissolving of the Arab Socialist Ba‘th Party and the allied parties of the National Progressive Front,
the dissolving of all military factions, political and civil revolutionary bodies, to be merge into state institutions,
the appointment of HTS commander Ahmad al-Shar‘ to the position of president during the transitional phase,
the authorization of President al-Shar‘ to form an interim legislative body until a permanent constitution is established.

Thirteen other military commanders spoke at the conference: six from the Syrian National Army (SNA), four from non-HTS Idlib factions (Ahrar al-Sham, Suqour al-Sham, Faylaq al-Sham, and Jaysh al-‘Izzah), two from Dar‘a, and one representing US-backed forces based in al-Tanf. The SNA-affiliated speakers included:

‘Azzam Gharib of al-Jabhah al-Shamiyah, currently the Caretaker Government’s Governor of Aleppo,
‘Issam al-Buwaydani of Jaysh al-Islam,
Fahim ‘Isa of Furqat al-Sultan Murad,
Ahmad al-Hayyes (“Abu Hatim Shaqra”) of Furqat Ahrar al-Sharqiyah and coalition Harakat al-Tahrir wa’l-Bina’, sanctioned by the US over human rights abuses,
Saif Abu Bakr of Furqat al-Hamzah and coalition al-Quwwah al-Mushtarikah, sanctioned by the US over human rights abuses,
Muhammad al-Jasim (“Abu ‘Amshah”) of Furqat al-Sultan Suleiman Shah and coalition al-Quwwah al-Mushtarikah, sanctioned by the US over human rights abuses…

02/01/25: A car bomb detonated in central Manbij, reportedly killing four civilians including two children and injuring nine others, while starting two fires in adjacent buildings… The Manbij Military Department published security camera footage showing a suspect - allegedly an SDF member from Kobani - leaving the parked car prior to its detonation.

02/03/25: A car bomb killed at least twenty civilians as it detonated on the M4 highway just outside Manbij. Fourteen of the victims were agricultural workers riding in the back of a passing truck. The SCD reported that this was the seventh such attack to occurring in and around Manbij over the previous 35 days. This attack - blamed on the SDF - was the deadliest to occur in Syria since the fall of the Asad regime and drew international condemnation from Jordan and Qatar…

02/03/25: The SCG reportedly placed Furqat al-Sultan Suleiman Shah commander Muhammad Jasim in charge of the Syrian Army’s Hama Division, formerly named the 25th Division and headed by Suhail al-Hasan. Jasim, a native of Hama, later acknowledged the assignment on Twitter while claiming he had also been promoted to the rank of Brigadier General. Meanwhile Ra’id al-‘Arab, commander of fellow SNA faction Suqour al-Shamal Northern Sector, was reportedly assigned to head the “118th Armored Division” in Homs…

02/06/25: A convoy from the GSD entered Afrin where it was greeted warmly by crowds of locals, some waving the Kurdish national flag in celebration. One banner seen in the crowd (image 2 below) read “Release all the prisoners, Safe return for the people of Afrin, Take the weapons from the militants,” in reference to abuses perpetrated by SNA factions since Turkey captured the region in March 2018…

02/11/25: President al-Shar‘ received delegations from Istanbul-based Etilaf and the affiliated Syrian Negotiating Commission, headed by Hadi al-Bahrah and Badr Jamous respectively, who congratulated him on his new position and handed over their mandates to the new state…

02/12/25: the SCG Presidency announced the creation of a seven person Preparatory Committee for the National Dialogue Conference, a so far vaguely outlined but greatly awaited assembly floated by HTS leadership that is to lay the groundwork for a new Syrian government…

02/16/25: President al-Shar‘ and Aleppo governor ‘Azzam Gharib visited Afrin where they met with a local delegation of notables including Afrin Local Council president Muhammad Sheikh Rashid. This occurred within the context of al-Shar‘ touring much of northwestern Syria, travelling from Idlib to Aleppo city, up to A‘zaz and Afrin, and eventually visiting the coast.

02/25/25: Syria’s long awaited National Dialogue Conference has come and gone in lightning speed, resulting in an 18 point list of non-binding recommendations for President al-Shar‘ and his caretake government, in addition to a host of criticism from actors across Syrian society. The suggestions… focus on the issues of state sovereignty, temporary and permanent constitutional frameworks, citizenship and tights, transitional justice, economic development, institutional reform, and the role of civil society, with varying degrees of vagueness.

The conference was held on February 24th and 25th in Damascus and reportedly attended by 533 individuals out of a total 550 invited, largely pulled from various sectors of civil society. The bulk of the conference occurred on the second day and featured six workshop groups organized around topics of transitional justice, constitutional construction, institutional construction and reform, personal freedoms and human rights, the role of civil society, and economic issues, as well as speeches made by President al-Shar‘ and Foreign Minister al-Shaibani, and a concluding sessions featuring the final statements...

03/03/25: President al-Shar‘ announced the creation of a seven person committee tasked with “drafting the constitutional declaration that regulates [Syria’s] transitional phase,” which is to be submitted to the President…

03/06/25: an untold number of former regime loyalists carried out a series of coordinated and deadly attacks against local deployment of the SCG’s Generl Security Directorate (a gendarmerie force affiliated with the Ministery of the Interior), briefly taking control of larges swathes of the countryside and some urban neighborhoods. In response the state deployed large numbers of security and military reinforcements [including SNA factions] while seemingly ad hoc calls for general mobilization spread across social media, resulting in a disorganized mass of heavily armed pro-government entities and individuals arriving on the coast in the tens of thousands.

By the next morning the insurgency had generally been defeated and the coast returned to the hands of the SCG-aligned security and military forces. This was followed by an anti-Alawi pogrom carried out by elements among the counter insurgency force resulting in the murder of hundreds of Alawi civilians - predominantly men - in villages and neighborhoods across the coast. In some cases these acts of dehumanizing abuse and mass killings were documented by the perpetrators themselves, shared to social media by pro-government (formerly pro-opposition) channels celebrating how ‘remnants of the regime’ treated. In other cases videos show women and children returning to the streets of their villages or neighborhoods to discover the corpses of their male family members dumped on top of one another in piles. We have yet to have a final confirmed number of civilians killed but it seems likely to be in the high hundreds to low thousands…

03/12/25: President al-Shar‘ announced the creation of a National Security Council, made up of the Foreign Minister al-Shaibani, Defense Minister Abu Qasrah, Director of General Intelligence Khattab, and Interior Minister Keddah, in addition to advisory seats and a “specialized technical seat” appointed by al-Shar‘.

03/13/25: President al-Shar‘ received and signed the “Constitutional Declaration” drafted by the seven-person constitutional committee created two weeks prior. The 53 article document - Syria’s interim constitution for the next five years - was published to social media by the officer of the Presidency…

Both DAANES and the ENKS published statements rejecting the Constitutional Declaration on the grounds of it overly centralizing power in the hands of the President and it not adequately representing Syria’s diverse population.

03/24/25: Saif Polat, the commander of the SNA’s Furqat al-Hamzah faction, was reportedly promoted to the rank of brigadier general and put in charge of the Syrian Military’s 76th Division…

03/28/25: The SCG Presidency appointed Usamah al-Rifa‘i to the position of Grand Mufti of the Syrian Arab Republic, tasked with supervising the work of the newly named fifteen member Supreme Fatwa Council…

03/29/25: President al-Shar‘ announced the formation of the new Syrian government, via the powers vested in him though the ‘Constitutional Declaration’ signed two week prior. The 23 member cabinet “is made up of several independent technocrats with HTS figures retaining all the major portfolios (foreign affairs, defence, interior) and includes representatives of religious and ethnic minorities, as well as ministers who served under the previous regime…”

04/09/25: The Aleppo provincial government appointed Mas‘oud Battal as its head official in the Afrin region. Battal is a Kurd from al-Qamishli, a former member of Jabhat al-Nusrah/HTS and its Idlib-based Salvation Government, and one of the new Government’s negotiators in talks with the SDF…

04/13/25: Various media outlets reported that the SNA’s Furqat al-Sultan Murad commander Fahim ‘Isa was appointed as a deputy Minister of Defense “for the affairs of the northern region…”

04/24/25: Aleppo Governor ‘Azzam Gharib appointed ‘Abd al-Rahman Salamah as ‘deputy supervisor of the Afrin, A‘zaz, al-Bab, Jarabulus, and Manbij regions,’ all previously administered by the Turkish-backed Syrian Interim Government, or in the case of Manbij by the DAANES…

05/04/25: Hussein al-Salamah was appointed head of Syria’s General Intelligence Service… He briefly served as Governor of Deir ez-Zour in January before coming to head the government’s negotiation and implementation team with regards to the March 10th SDF agreement…

05/05/25: The Ministry of Defense appointed Ahmad al-Hayyes (aka Abu Hatim Shaqra) commander of the 86th Division, reportedly responsible for Syria’s eastern provinces of Deir ez-Zour, al-Raqqah, and al-Hasakah. Al-Hayyes, a native of Deir ez-Zour, is the longtime commander of Furqat Ahrar al-Sharqiyah and of Harakat al-Tahrir wa’l-Bina’, the coalition of mostly eastern SNA factions to which it currently belongs…

05/21/25: Aleppo Governor ‘Azzam Gharib appointed Hashim al-Sheikh aka Abu Jabir as head official of the Manbij district, a position created in April and intended to “enhance administrative performance and direct communication with citizens…”

05/27/25: President al-Shar‘ presided over festivities at the Aleppo Citadel, commemorating six months since the start of the HTS-led Operation Deterring Aggression that led to the rapid capture of Aleppo city and ensuing complete collapse of the Asad regime just several days later.

05/28/25: The Aleppo provincial government appointed Yasir Ahmad ‘Abdo, formerly the head of a local humanitarian organization, official of the Jarabulus district. Later in the week Khalid Hajj Yasin, a former military and police commander, was appointed official for the al-Bab district…

05/28/25: Various local social media outlets reported that Turkey began the evacuation of SNA fighters from Libya. SNA fighters have been deployed to Libya on a rotational basis since late 2019 as part of a mercenary scheme devised by Turkey to support Libya’s Government of National Accord that rules the western half of the country.

06/04/25: President al-Shar‘ received Syrian Army Chief of Staff ‘Ali Nour al-Din al-Na‘san and 40 commanders from the Ministry of Defense, including at least five SNA figures:

Saif Polat, commander of Furqat al-Hamzah/76th Division
Muhammad Jasim (Abu ‘Amsha), commander of Furqat al-Sultan Suleiman Shah/62nd Division
Ahmad al-Hayyes (Abu Hatim), commander of Furqat Ahrar al-Sharqiyah/86th Division
Ra’id Arab, (Abu Arab) commander of Suqour al-Sham Northern Sector/118th Armored Division
Ahmad Rizq, commander of Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki/80th Division

Damascus/SDF negotiations

12/30/24: The first talks were held between Ahmad al-Shar‘ and SDF representatives in Damascus, under US coordination.

02/17/25: A spokesmen for the Ministry of Oil and Mineral Resources told local radio station ArabesqueFM that a contract had been signed to import 500,000 cubic meters of natural gas per day from SDF-controlled northeastern Syria. This is to be used in power stations to at least partially alleviate the ongoing electricity crisis…

03/10/25: the Syrian Presidency announced via social media that President al-Shar‘ and SDF commander Mazloum ‘Abdi had signed an agreement in Damascus “stipulating the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces into the institutions of the Syrian Arab Republic, emphasizing the unity of Syrian territory and rejecting partition.” Attached to the announcement were photos of al-Shar‘ and ‘Abdi and a copy of the eight point document signed by the two former insurgents. These read as follows:

Guaranteeing the rights of all Syrians to representation and participation in the political process and state institutions based on competence, regardless of their religious or ethnic backgrounds.
The Kurdish community is indigenous to Syria, and the Syrian state guarantees its right to citizenship and all constitutional rights.
A nationwide ceasefire across all Syrian territories.
The integration of all civil and military institutions in northeastern Syria into the administration of the Syrian state, including border crossings, the airport, and oil and gas fields.
Ensuring the return of all displaced Syrians to their towns and villages and securing their protection by the Syrian state.
Supporting the Syrian state in its fight against Asad’s remnants and all threats that endanger its security and unity.
Rejecting calls for division, hate speech, and attempts to incite discord among the components of Syrian society.
The executive committees shall work towards implementing the agreement no later than the end of the current year.

03/19/25: An SCG delegation travelled to northeastern Syria to meet with SDF commander Mazloum ‘Abdi and begin discussions regarding the implementation of the March 10th agreement…Hussein al-Salamah, head of the SCG delegation, told SyriaTV that the meeting took place in the presence of American officials at the al-Shaddadi military base in southern al-Hasakah…

03/27/25: The Aleppo provincial media outlet reported that maintenance crews had finally reached the al-Khafsah water station after four months of clashes between the SDF and SNA on the nearby Tishrin dam and Deir Hafir fronts resulted in damage and a substantial decrease in water provision…

04/01/25: An agreement was reached between the committee assigned by the SCG Presidency with implementing the February SCG/SDF deal and the DAANES Civil Council for the al-Sheikh Maqsoud and al-Ashrafiyah neighborhoods of Aleppo city regarding its integration into SCG-administered Aleppo.

The fourteen point document reads:

The Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh neighborhoods, which have a Kurdish majority, will have appointed administrators, and the protection and respect for the social and cultural privacy of the neighborhoods will be activated.
The provisions of this civil agreement will apply once the Kurdish and central Syrian sides agree on a sustainable text.
The Ministry of Interior will coordinate with internal security forces to ensure the protection of the residents of the neighborhoods and prevent any attacks or threats to their lives.
Armed manifestations in the neighborhoods will be prohibited, limiting weapons to the hands of the internal security forces affiliated with the Ministry of Interior in the neighborhoods.
Opening crossings between the neighborhoods while keeping the main barriers under the supervision of the internal security affiliated with the Ministry of Interior of the Syrian state and the internal security of the neighborhoods.
The withdrawal of military forces affiliated with the SDF will occur gradually from the neighborhoods to their concentration area in northeastern Syria.
Establishing an internal security center in each of the Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhoods.
Prevention of pursuing any individuals pursued prior to the agreement, provided they “do not have blood on their hands” of Syrians.
Forming a coordination committee to facilitate movement and transportation between the city of Aleppo and northeastern Syria.
Establishing technical committees to implement the agreement on the ground.
Coordination between civil institutions to provide services to the neighborhoods without discrimination against other neighborhoods in Aleppo, through municipal teams present in the neighborhoods.
Discussing the fate of detainees from both sides in Aleppo province and exchanging all prisoners captured after liberation.
Granting the neighborhoods the right to fair representation in the Aleppo Provincial Council, chambers of commerce, industry, and other sectors, in accordance with existing laws.
Preserving the existing service, administrative, educational, municipal institutions, and local councils in the neighborhoods until the joint committees agree on a sustainable solution.

The signees include Director of the Aleppo Security Directorate Muhammad ‘Abd al-Ghani, SCG representative Mas‘oud Battal and co-chairs of the DAANES local council Nouri Sheikho and Hefin Suleiman.

04/03/25: The implementation of last week’s 14 point agreement reached between the Aleppo provincial government and local DAANES administration of the al-Sheikh Maqsoud and al-Ashrafiyah neighborhoods began… with a prisoner swap between the two sides… The following day an SDF column left the Aleppo city enclave for DAANES areas east of the Euphrates, reportedly consisting of approximately 500 fighters with light and medium weaponry…

Reporting throughout the week has also alleged that the two sides have engaged in talks regarding the Tishrin dam - the focal point of SDF/SNA clashes since early December. On April 5th state media outlet SANA reported that “maintenance teams have entered the… [dam] to begin repairs in preparation for its return to service…”

04/09/25: A second batch of SDF fighters left the al-Sheikh Masqoud and al-Ashrafiyah neighborhoods of Aleppo city as part of the deal struck with the Syrian Government on April 1st…

04/12/25: Syrian Government military and security forces conducted an SDF-coordinated field visit to eastern Aleppo’s Tishrin dam as part of ongoing nationwide negotiations. A coalition delegation was also reportedly present…

04/12/25: The SDF published a statement regarding a meeting between SDF commander Mazloum ‘Abdi and General Command member Rohlat Afrin, and Syrian Government representative Hussein al-Salamah regarding the implementation of the March 10th agreement and the situation around Tishrin dam. This is the second such meeting held by the two sides since the signing of the agreement by President al-Shar‘ and Mazloum ‘Abdi, while Hussein al-Salamah told reporters that a third was to take place soon after…

04/15/25: The first coordination meeting was held between local Aleppo government officials and members of the DAANES-affiliated al-Sheikh Maqsoud local administration regarding municipal work and service provision…

04/13/25: A delegation from the DAANES Education Authority traveled to Damascus where they met with Minister of Education Muhammad Turko to discuss a preliminary agreement reached between the two sides regarding the education portfolio. Pressing issues include this year’s nationwide exams and the thousands of students who have graduated over the years from the DAANES unaccredited school system…

04/16/25: The ‘Central Committee’ appointed by President al-Shar‘ to oversee the implementation of the agreement with the SDF visited the al-Sheikh Maqsoud and al-Ashrafiyah neighborhoods of Aleppo, where they met with co-chairs of the DAANES local council Nouri Sheikho and Hefin Suleiman, and senior cadre Bedran Çiya Kurd. Present on the government side was head of the committee Hussein al-Salamah, Director of the Aleppo Political Affairs Directorate Sa‘d Na‘san, and Director of the Aleppo Security Directorate Muhammad ‘Abd al-Ghani.

04/18/25: SDF commander Mazloum ‘Abdi paid a visit to the Tishrin dam following the agreement reached last week with the Syrian government over its fate, saying that “today we confirm that the war phase is over, and we, as Syrians, will resort to dialogue to resolve all differences…” The same day an unprecedented joint patrol was reportedly carried out by the government’s General Security Department, the SDF, and Coalition forces along the M4 highway to al-Tirwaziyah near al-Raqqah/al-Hasakah border, along the SDF/SNA front lines approximately 125km into SDF territory from Tishrin dam.

04/20/25: A DAANES delegation including senior cadre Badran Çiya Kurd and the co-chairs of the al-Sheikh Maqsoud government visited Aleppo governor ‘Azzam Gharib and recently appointed Afrin regional official Mas‘oud Battal… The following day a coordination meeting was held between the local neighborhood councils and representatives of the Aleppo governorate regarding service provision.

04/28/25: Negotiations reportedly stall after clashes between Syrian government forces and Druze militias in Damascus suburbs break out.

05/05/25: Syrian government officials reportedly met with an SDF delegation at Conoco gas field in central Deir ez-Zour following last week’s tensions over the Kurdish unity conference, in what was the fourth such meeting following the March 10th agreement… The meeting was reportedly headed by SDF commander Mazloum ‘Abdi and leading government representative Hussein al-Salamah, recently appointed head of Syrian General Intelligence…

05/25/25: DAANES, the Syrian government, and the Coalition held a tripartite meeting at al-Hawl camp (some reports place the meeting the day before) during which they established “a joint mechanism with the transitional government in Syria to remove Syrian families from Al-Hawl camp.”

06/01/25: the Syrian government hosted the SDF negotiating delegation in Damascus, to continue talks around implement the March 10th agreement signed by President al-Shar‘ and Mazloum ‘Abdi. According to both Syrian state and pro-SDF media the meeting resulted in:

Forming specialized subcommittees to follow up on the implementation of the March 10 agreement, signed between the Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces, Mazloum ‘Abdi, and the President of the Transitional Government, Ahmad al-Shar‘
Striving to resolve outstanding issues in the examination file and examination centers, in a manner that guarantees student rights and the integrity of the educational process.
Discussing mechanisms to facilitate the return of displaced persons to their areas, and working to remove obstacles that hinder this return.
Reactivating the Ashrafiyah and al-Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhoods file, and seeking to address it in a way that serves stability and civil peace.

… The SDF delegation included:

Fawza Yousuf (PYD), ‘Abd al-Hamid al-Mahbash (Future Syria Party), Sanharib Barsoum, (Syriac Union Party), Ahmad Yousuf (DAANES), Suzdar Hajji (SDF), Maryam Ibrahim (DAANES), Yasir Suleiman (DAANES)

while the government negotiating team included:

Muhammad Qanatari (Deputy Director of the US Office at the Ministry of Foreign Affair), Muhammad ‘Abd al-Ghani (Director of Internal Security for Aleppo Governorate), Mas‘oud Battal (Afrin district official), Ziyad Fawwaz Al-‘Ayish (Assistant Minister of Interior for Civil Affairs)

The following day the long-awaited second prisoner exchange between the government and the SDF took place in Aleppo city, signaling that progress had been made in restarting the al-Sheikh Maqsoud deal…

06/08/25: DAANES announced that its Education Authority reached an agreement with the government’s Ministry of Education over middle school government curriculum certificate exams during meetings held June 5th-6th. The document published listed six terms of agreement:

Postponing exams for middle school students from 06/14/2025 to 06/21/2025.
Forming temporary joint committees to supervise the management of the examination process in the regions of northern and eastern Syria, in a way that ensures integrity and professionalism in implementing the examinations.
Opening joint and temporary examination registration centers to receive students from different regions, and facilitating their registration procedures in accordance with approved educational standards.
Registration starts from 06/11/2025 until 06/17/2025.
Facilitating the process of transferring registration for students registered outside the regions of northern and eastern Syria, ensuring the continuity of their right to take exams without obstacles.
Conducting exams in six main cities distributed within five provinces: al-Qamishli, al-Hasakah, al-Raqqah, Deir ez-Zor, al-Tabqah, and Kobani (Sarrin), in a manner that suits logistical conditions and achieves easy access for students.

DAANES/SDF + intra-Kurdish politics

12/12/24: DAANES instituted a 5pm - 8am curfew in areas under its control.

01/08/25: Turkish airstrikes landed in the vicinity of a column of demonstrators headed towards the Tishrin dam, reportedly killing five and injuring fifteen others. The DAANES-organized demonstration later arrived at the dam, the target of the ongoing SNA offensive against the SDF. Turkey accused the SDF of using the demonstrators as human shields… [similar attacks ensuing in the following weeks]

01/13/25: Hamid Darbandi, a representative of KDP leader Mas‘oud Barzani, paid an unprecedented public visit to al-Hasakah where he met with SDF commander-in-chief Mazloum ‘Abdi in addition to leaders of the KDP-backed, Syrian opposition-aligned Kurdish National Council (ENKS). Darbandi is head of the Public Relations Department of the Presidency of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and is in charge of the KRG’s Syria file, which includes ENKS funding…

01/16/25: SDF Commander Mazloum ‘Abdi traveled to Erbil to hold a historic meeting with Mas‘oud Barzani, Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) President and father of KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani. According to both ‘Abdi and Barzani the talk focused on Kurdish unity regarding negotiations with Damascus…

01/23/25: Speaking at the camp, DAANES officials announced that it was “allowing Syrian citizens residing in al-Houl… to voluntarily return to their areas of residence,” offering to provide secure trips for returnees. Currently the high security camp for Islamic State-linked individuals - mostly women and children - reportedly houses roughly 40,000 individuals, 16,000 of whom are Syrian citizens [worth highlighting that this is a separate population from the estimated 9,000 Islamic State members held in SDF/DAANES prisons]. A large portion of the remainder are Iraqi citizens, while the rest are the more high profile third country nationals whose countries of origin are either refusing to repatriate them for political expediency, or are doing so quite slowly…

01/28/25: SDF commander Mazloum ‘Abdi met with the ENKS Presidential Committee, with the two sides reportedly agreed to forming a unified position with regards to the SCG in Damascus and sending a joint delegation for negotiations, while also agreeing to hold additional meetings in the near future.

01/28/25: A reported Turkish drone strike hit the central street town of Sarrin, killing eight civilians including four children, gathered around fruit and vegetable carts…

02/17/25: According to a spokeswoman for the mostly Kurdish DEM party in Turkey, letters written by Abdullah Öcalan - imprisoned head of the PKK - had been delivered to the DAANES in addition to the KCK umbrella organization based in Iraqi Kurdistan’s Qandil mountains. The correspondence relates to ongoing efforts by President Erdoğan and his ultranationalist coalition party Devlet Bahçeli to reach some sort of agreement with Öcalan with regards to PKK insurgency and the future of allied groups such as the PYD, and comes after a DEM delegation was granted a visit to Öcalan in Imrali, the island prison where he has been held since his arrest in 1999…

03/17/25: A reported Turkish drone strike killed nine members of the same family, including both parents and seven children. According to the Asayish the strike hit the family’s farm, located…under ten kilometers northeast of the Qaraqozak bridge…

03/18/25: SyriaTV reported that DAANES security forces arrested dozens of individuals across al-Hasakah governorate, allegedly for using the green Syrian revolution flag and voicing support of the SCG following the SCG/SDF agreement and the March 15th and 18th anniversaries…

03/21/25: The PYD - the party at the core of the DAANES and SDF - and their main Kurdish rivals the ENKS reportedly agreed on a joint list of demands to be made to the new government in Damascus on behalf of Syria’s Kurds later in the month…

04/23/25: SDF commander Mazloum ‘Abdi and SDC Foreign Relations co-chair Ilham Ahmed traveled to Erbil where they held meetings with KRI President Nechirvan Barzani and with French FM Jean-Noël Barrot.

04/24/25: A delegation of Kurdish political figures from Turkey arrived in northeastern Syria, including members of DEM party, to attend the upcoming Kurdish unity conference and later meeting with DAANES, SDC, and ENKS officials.

04/26/25: The long-awaited “Unity of Kurdish Position and Rank” conference was held in al-Qamishli with a speech by SDF commander Mazloum ‘Abdi followed by an address written by KDP President Mas‘oud Barzan and read allowed by Hamid Darbandi… The 26 point document produced by the conference calls for federalization and decentralization, the unification of ‘Kurdish regions’ as “an integrated political and administrative unit,” awarding Kurds in Syria national recognition, recognizing the Ezidi faith as an official religion of the state, reversing Arabization policies, and making Newroz (March 21st) and the anniversary of the 2004 Qamishli uprising (March 12th) national holidays, among other demands… The following day the Syrian Presidency published a statement “regarding the developments on the agreement with the ‘SDF’ leadership,” stating that “the activities and statements recently issued by the ‘SDF’ leadership, which call for federalism and consecrate a separate reality on the ground, clearly conflict with the content of the agreement and threaten the country’s unity and safety of its soil…”

05/05/25: A delegation from the DAANES Executive Council visited Tishrin dam where they announced an end to the demonstration that has taken place at the dam since January 8th…

05/07/25: the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) held its party congress in Iraqi Kurdistan, in response to calls to disband from imprisoned leader Abdullah Öcalan as part of the ongoing 'peace process' initiated by the Turkish ruling coalition in October of last year. On the 12th the group published its 'Final Declaration,' announcing:

The Extraordinary 12th Congress evaluated that the PKK’s struggle has dismantled the policies of denial and annihilation imposed on our people, bringing the Kurdish issue to a point where it can be resolved through democratic politics. It concluded that the PKK has fulfilled its historical mission. Based on this, the 12th Congress resolved to dissolve the PKK’s organizational structure and end the armed struggle, with the implementation process to be managed and led by Leader Apo [Abdullah Öcalan]. All activities conducted under the PKK name have therefore been concluded.

05/30/25: Speaking to the Kurdistan Democratic Party-affiliated Arabic language channel Shams TV Mazloum ‘Abdi said that the SDF was in direct communication with Turkey and that he is not opposed to meeting with President Erdoğan. The same day Al-Monitor’s Amberin Zaman reported that “that either Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan or Turkey's intelligence chief have offered a meeting with [Mazloum ‘Abdi],” though this was later denied by Turkey and the SDF. As for the previously unknown existence of communications between Turkey and the SDF Zaman later reported that this began last year with initial meetings in France and Switzerland, as part of Turkey’s ongoing efforts to end the PKK conflict, and now includes meetings between the two sides inside Turkey.

06/04/25: A Kurdish unity delegation was formed to representing the platform made between independent, PYD-, and ENKS-affiliated parties at the April 26th conference in future talks with Damascus. The delegation is to be headed by Perwin Yusif (PYD executive co-chair) and Muhammad Ismail (ENKS president), while consisting of:

Aldar Xelil (PYD)
Rihan Loqo (Kongra Star)
Sulîman Osso (ENKS presidential council member)
Feysel Yûsif (ENKS spokesman)
Ahmad Suleiman (independent PDPKS - Barakat faction deputy leader),
Salah Darwish (independent PDPKS - Darwish faction),
Nasr al-Din Ibrahim (independent PYD-leaning KDPS - 'al-Parti')

International relations

12/12/24: The US reportedly reached an agreement with Turkey to halt the SNA advance on SDF-controlled Kobani, though fighting continues along the front lines.

12/14/24: Turkey reopens its embassy in Damascus after closing it in 2012.

12/20/24: The United States lifts the $10m bounty placed on Ahmad al-Shar‘ (aka Abu Muhammad al-Julani) after Assistant Secretary of State Barbara Leaf met with the interim president in Damascus.

12/21/24: Qatar reopens its embassy in Damascus after closing it in 2012.

01/06/25: The US Treasury issued a six month sanctions exemption aimed at “ensuring that U.S. sanctions do not impede activities to meet basic human needs, including the provision of public services or humanitarian assistance…”

01/15/25: The SCG’s Foreign Minister As‘ad al-Shaibani, Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasrah, and Director of the General Intelligence Service Anas Khattab paid a joint visit to Turkey where they met with President Erdoğan, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, MIT Director Ibrahim Kalin, and Defense Minister Yaşar Güler…

01/15/25: President Biden amended Executive Order 13894 to remove all mentions of the Government of Turkey, partially acquiescing to repeated Turkish requests over the years. The executive order, which allows for the sanctioning of those deemed to be engaging in “actions or policies that further threaten the peace, security, stability, or territorial integrity of Syria,” was originally signed by Trump in October 2019 in an attempt to freeze Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring against the SDF in northeastern Syria and has remained on the books since, much to Turkey’s chagrin.

01/30/25: Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani of Qatar visited Syria, where he was received by the new anointed President Ahmad al-Shar‘. The Emir’s visit was the first by a foreign head of state since the fall of the Asad regime…

02/02/25: President al-Shar‘ visited Saudi Arabia on his first trip abroad as Syrian head of state, meeting with Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman in Riyadh and performing ‘Umrah pilgrimage in Mecca with his wife and FM al-Shaibani. By choosing Saudi Arabia as his first official destination al-Shar‘ likely attempted to assuage Gulf fears regarding the new Syrian' government’s relationship with Turkey and the potential disruption that might cause to regional dynamics now that relations between Turkey and Qatar on the one hand and the GCC on the other have been mended to some degree…

02/04/25: On his second official foreign visit President al-Shar‘ traveled to Ankara to meet with President Erdoğan. According to Reuters reporting beforehand the two were “expected to discuss a joint defense pact in Ankara on Tuesday, including establishing Turkish airbases in central Syria and training for Syria's new army…”

02/15/25: Foreign Minister As‘ad al-Shaibani met KRI President Nechirvan Barzani as both attended the Munich Security Conference. Nechirvan is the son of KDP leader Masoud Barzani and brother of current KRI Prime Minister Masrour Barzani… FM al-Shaibani also met with Turkish FM Hakan Fidan on the Munich sidelines. Fidan later told reporters that Turkey “would reconsider its military presence in northeastern Syria if that country's new leaders eliminate” the SDF.

02/24/25: The EU suspended a number of sanctions imposed on Syria. The move lifted “restrictions on oil, gas and electricity, and sanctions on the transport sector,” while removing “asset freezes for five banks, eased restrictions on the Syrian central bank and indefinitely extended an exemption to facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid…”

03/04/25: President al-Shar‘ travelled to Egypt to partake in the emergency Arab League Summit called in response to President Trump’s and Israel’s proposed ethnic cleansing of the Gaza Strip… While at the meeting al-Shar‘ met with several heads of state for the first time, including Egyptian President Sisi and PA President Mahmoud ‘Abbas, in addition to UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres who was there as an observer.

03/06/25: The UK removed sanctions placed on 24 different Syrian entities including “six state-owned commercial banks…, ten companies involved in Syria’s oil and gas sector” and the Syrian Arab Airlines, while unfreezing Syrian central bank assets. The following day Switzerland also “lifted certain sanctions against Syria’s energy and transport sector.”

03/09/25: SCG officials took part in a high level quadrilateral meeting in Amman along with representatives of Turkey, Iraq, and Jordan, as part of a new cooperative structure for regional security designed by Turkey. The foreign ministers, defense ministers, and heads of national intelligence organizations of the four countries met to “discuss cooperation in the areas of security, combating terrorism and organised crime, as well as regional developments…”

03/13/25: A high level delegation including Foreign Minister Fidan, Defense Minister Güler, and MIT chief Kalin visited Damascus where they met with President al-Shar‘ and their Syrian counterparts. The officials reportedly discussed how the deal recently signed by al-Shar‘ and SDF commander Mazloum ‘Abdi, and how implementation is to proceed, among other topics..

03/25/25: Various outlets reported that US gave the SCG a list of conditions to be fulfilled in exchange for further sanctions relief during the previous week’s Brussels Conference. These are said to include:

appointing a liaison to assist with the search for information on Austin Tice,
ensure the full elimination of weapons of mass destruction,
commit to no engagement with Hamas, Islamic Jihad or other Palestinian militant groups,
no foreign fighters in high-ranking government positions,
designate Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization,
issue a public declaration of support for the US military mission to defeat the Islamic State in Syria,
recognize the US right to target a designated individual in Syrian territory,
taking responsibility for the more than 15,000 Syrian detainees in Al-Hol camp…

04/11/25: President al-Shar‘ and Foreign Minister al-Shaibani met with a number of foreign heads of state during their appearance at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in Turkey, including President Erdogan and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq’s President Nechirvan Barzani…

04/17/25: Citing two senior officials the New York Times reported that the US military began a drawdown of troops in northeast Syria “reducing troop levels to about 1,400 from 2,000.” Additionally the Times sources said that the military was shuttering MSS Green Village and MSS Euphrates - its two bases in Deir ez-Zour governorate - in addition to “a third much smaller facility…”

04/18/25: Two Republican congressmen visited Syria in the first such visit since the fall of the former regime. The several day trip including a tour around Damascus, meetings with President al-Shar‘, Foreign Minister al-Shaibani, and local Christian community representatives…

04/24/25: The UK lifted sanctions on various Syrian institutions including the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, General Intelligence Directorate and other intelligence and security agencies, in addition to several state media outlets.

04/25/25: Foreign Minister As‘ad al-Shaibani was in NYC where he attended a Security Council meeting and oversaw the raising of the new Syrian flag in front of the UN. The following day al-Shaibani met with Arab diplomats reportedly to discuss unifying Arab positions in the UN.

04/30/25: Reuters reported that Foreign Minister al-Shaibani met with US State Department officials in New York the day prior, the first such meeting in the US…

05/07/25: President al-Shar‘ traveled to France in his first trip to Europe, where he met with President Macron, Syrian whistleblower Farid al-Madhhan aka 'Caesar,' and several Syrian and French organizations. At a joint press conference Macron advocated for the continued removal of sanctions placed on Syria by Europe and the US, while demanding accountability for the sectarian massacres perpetrated by pro-government forces on the Syria coast in March.

05/08/25: Reuters reported that the US “has greenlighted a Qatari initiative to bankroll Syria's public sector,” after previous reticence on the part of Qatar due to sanctions. The plan is to “to provide Syria with $29 million monthly for three months… in order to pay salaries to civilian public-sector workers…” excluding the defense and interior ministries…

05/13/25: In a speech given to a Saudi-American investment forum in Riyadh, President Trump announced his intention to remove all US sanctions on Syria, crediting Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (in the audience) and Turkish President Erdoğan with influencing the decision… This came as part of Trump’s ongoing visit to the Gulf, the first official state visits of his second term, and followed reports several days prior that Syrian President al-Shar‘ had indirectly pitched the US several offers including a Trump Tower in Damascus in a bid for sanctions relief…

05/14/25: President al-Shar‘ travelled to Saudi Arabia where attended a historic meeting with Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman and US President Trump, following the latter’s announcement the day before of his intention to removal all sanctions on Syria. Turkish President Erdoğan reportedly joined the meeting by phone…

05/15/25: Foreign Minister al-Shaibani travelled to Ankara to meet US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Turkish counterpart Hakan Fidan, and discuss sanctions relief following President Trump’s announcement two days prior…

05/20/25: MIT chief Ibrahim Kalin traveled to Damascus where he met with President al-Shar‘, FM al-Shaibani, and newly appointed General Intelligence Service director Hussein al-Salamah. According to Turkish state media “the issues of the integration of the [SDF], like other groups, into the new Syria by laying down its arms, border security and customs gates, and the transfer of prisons and camps where [Islamic State] members are located to the administration were discussed,” among other topics…

05/20/25: The US hosted a Turkish interagency delegation in DC as part of the 'Syrian Working Group,' where they “discussed shared priorities in Syria, including sanctions relief according to President Trump’s directive and combatting terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.”

5/20/25: The EU announced it will be lifting all sanctions targeting Syria’s economy in a conditional manner, though sanctions targeting former regime officials and those “based on security grounds, including arms and technology that might be used for internal repression” will remain in place.

05/23/25: US ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack assumed the role of special envoy to Syria… According to Al-Monitor “the appointment of Barrack is likely to give Trump a direct finger on the pulse of Syria policy, which was plagued by internal wrangling during his first administration.”

05/23/25: Following President Trump’s May 13th announcement of his intention to remove sanctions on Syria the Treasury Department issued General License No. 25, “Authorizing Transactions Prohibited by the Syrian Sanctions Regulations.” Several days later the Department published an FAQ on the sanctions exemptions issued in the license. Additionally the State Department waived the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act for a period of six months…

05/24/25: President al-Shar‘ and Turkish President Erdoğan met for an hour and a half in Istanbul during an unannounced visit, where they reportedly discussed US sanctions relief and Syrian-Turkish bilateral relations. The meeting was also attended by a number of high ranking officials on both sides including Syrian Foreign Minister al-Shaibani and Defense Minister Abu Qasrah in addition to Turkish MFA Fidan, Defense Minister Güler, MIT chief Kalin, and Head of Defense Industries Haluk Görgün.

05/24/25: Special envoy Barrack met with President al-Shar‘ and FM al-Shaibani in Istanbul. According to Barrack’s statement the conversation focused on sanctions relief in addition to “foreign terrorist fighters, counter-ISIS measures, relations with Israel, and camps and detention centers in NE Syria.”

05/28/25: The EU announced the lifting of “all economic restrictive measures on Syria, with the exception of those based on security grounds,” including sanctions previously imposed on the Syrian Central Bank. Additionally the EU imposed new sanctions on three former SNA factions - Furqat al-Hamzah, Furqat al-Sultan Suleiman Shah, and Furqat al-Sultan Murad - and Hamzah and Suleiman Shah commanders Saif Polat and Muhammad Jasim ('Abu ‘Amshah') for “serious human rights abuses” allegedly perpetrated by the group during the coastal massacres of March 2025…

05/29/25: The government signed a memorandum of understanding with a Qatari-led consortium for the development of “major power generation projects with a foreign investment valued at about $7 billion,” including the construction of four new gas powerplants, expanding the 5,000 megawatts.

05/29/25: Turkey, Jordan, and Syria reportedly began regional security coordination via the establishment of a 'Joint Operations Center' in Damascus. This is the first concrete step in a Turkish floated plan of an 'anti-terrorism' alliance officially aimed at countering the Islamic State though obviously a reference to the PKK and associated groups like the SDF as well…

05/29/25: Newly appointed Syria envoy Tom Barrack made his first visit to the country, during which he met with President al-Shar‘, gave a speech at the Presidential Palace, and raised the American flag over the ambassador’s residence. The same day Barrack reportedly called SDF commander Mazloum ‘Abdi, assuring him “of the United States’ continued support for his forces in the fight against the Islamic State and encouraged him to continue US-mediated de-escalation talks between the SDF and Turkey.”

06/02/25: Reuters reported that the US gave the Syrian government the greenlight to include foreign fighters in the new national military. According to anonymous Syrian defense officials “some 3,500 foreign fighters, mainly Uyghurs from China and neighbouring countries, would join a newly-formed unit, the 84th Syrian army division…”

06/04/25: Minister of Defense Yaşar Güler told Reuters that Turkey has “started providing military training and consultancy services, while taking steps to increase Syria's defence capacity,” and “it was too early to discuss possible withdrawal or relocation of the more than 20,000 Turkish troops in Syria.”