On the Syrian National Army
A brief overview of the factions and and their commanders as HTS state building efforts continue
Note to subscribers: Merry Christmas and Happy Holidays to all. I have a couple pieces planned that I hope to get out before the New Year but we shall see. The situation in northern Syria remains very much up in the air, with the US acting more assertively than expected and Turkey’s bellicosity for now being tempered by its cautiousness. This will all be addressed in greater detail soon. Thank you for your patience.
One of the main questions to emerge since the fall of the Asad regime on December 8th, 2024, has been how Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) commander al-Ahmad Shar‘ will dissolve the dozens of opposition militias active throughout the country into a functioning national military. The primary challenge in this endeavor will be the Syrian National Army (SNA), a collection of militias largely based in northern Aleppo, funded, armed, and trained by Turkey. One key aspect to emphasize when discussing the SNA is that it has never operated in a particularly cohesive manner. The factions of the SNA are largely led in a personalized manner by individual commanders and their entourages, often in direct competition with one another.
What has glued these groups to one another has been historical circumstance and Turkish patronage. Given the dramatic and ongoing developments that have occurred in Syria in the wake of the HTS-led offensive launched in late November the conditions which that gave rise to the SNA have changed. Previously Turkey’s direct and public relations with Syrian opposition factions primarily involved the SNA. With HTS’s increased stature domestically and internationally and Turkey’s eagerness to solidify its role in Damascus, a noticeable shift has occurred in public Turkish engagement with the former al-Qa‘idah affiliate. This refocusing of attention from northern Aleppo to Damascus and Turkey’s desire to see Syria function under unified rule from Damascus will undoubtedly have ramifications for the SNA. That said Turkey is unlikely to ditch its long time patrons and proxies in the immediate future, especially given the leading role at least some of the SNA has played in ongoing clashes along the banks of the Euphrates with the SDF - Turkey’s primary foe in Syria.
On December 24th at least four SNA commanders were seen meeting with HTS leader Ahmad al-Shar‘ in Damascus, in which them and other military commanders reportedly agreed to dissolve their forces under the auspices of the new Syrian government’s Minister of Defense. The former included ‘Azzam Gharib of al-Jabhah al-Shamiyah, recently appointed the Governor of Aleppo, ‘Issam Buwaydani of Jaysh al-Islam, al-Furqah 51/3rd Legion commander Muhammad Jamal Deiri, and al-Mu‘tasim ‘Abbas of Furqat al-Mu‘tasim. According to al-Jabhah al-Shamiyah those taking part in the meeting make up the ‘General Command’ of the Military Operations Administration, the HTS-led body that oversaw the offensive that collapsed the Asad regime. It appears that despite these factions’ official SNA affiliations they are in Damascus seeking to find their own roles within the national Syrian government, independent of the formal SNA structure.
Due to the SNA’s clear lack of ‘asabiyah and the likelihood that individual SNA-affiliated actors will take different approaches to the HTS-led state building project, it seems worthwhile to restate what the SNA is exactly and to outline the actors involved. In a piece I published earlier this month I separated the SNA into five primary tendencies:
Roughly these can be divided into several trends: (A) those closest to Turkey, often with pre-SNA ties to MİT and some connection to Syria’s Turkmen population, including Furqat al-Hamzah, Furqat al-Sultan Murad, and Furqat al-Sultan Suleiman Shah, (B) al-Jabhah al-Shamiyah, a faction local to A‘zaz and the northern Aleppo countryside that in the past has acted the most independently of Turkey, (C) factions of fighters originally from Syria’s eastern provinces, now banded together under the name Harakat al-Tahrir wa’l-Bina’, (D) Jaysh al-Islam and Faylaq al-Rahman, two factions originally from the Damascus suburbs that were displaced to northern Syria in 2018, (E) smaller, less influential factions with roots in the early rural Idlib and Aleppo insurgencies.
Below I have summarized the history of the SNA and elaborated this further on this categorization schema by briefly profiling each of the factions involved (to the extent I have information on them). For more detail on the overall dynamics check out these two essays I wrote in 2022 and 2023: “A Tale of Two Muharrar's: The bifurcated state of opposition-controlled northwestern Syria” and “The governance structure of Turkish-controlled Afrin.”
History
The Syrian National Army was created in late 2017 following a series of meetings orchestrated by Turkey and held in the Turkish border city of Gaziantep. The factions that took part in these were all based in the Euphrates Shield region of northern Aleppo, created by way of the Turkish military operation of 2016-17 bearing the same name that captured the approximately 2,000 km2 area from the Islamic State. Many of these militias were based in what was the A‘zaz-Tell Rifa‘at corridor that connected the Bab al-Salamah border crossing to opposition-controlled parts of Aleppo city and Idlib province prior to adjacent SDF and regime offensives in Spring 2016 which cut A‘zaz and a handful of surrounding villages and towns from the rest of opposition territory. Others arrived there later, to take part in the Turkish-led offensive.
The geographic separation of these areas from Idlib and the rest of Aleppo province allowed factions present to operate without the threat of domination by HTS predecessor Jabhat al-Nusrah, which consolidated the rest of the opposition under its wings in the ensuing years. As regime offensives captured opposition pockets elsewhere in the country in 2017-18, this geographic bifurcation came define Syria’s armed opposition overall.
On the one hand you had HTS-controlled Idlib, where non-HTS armed factions - many allied with one another under the al-Jabhah al-Wataniyah lil-Tahrir umbrella - operated with HTS permission. Turkey supported some of these groups active in Idlib while deploying its military to observation points ringing the region, set up in coordination with Russia as deconfliction measures relating to the Astana process. Some SNA factions deployed contingents of fighters into Idlib with HTS permission, to serve in a purely military capacity (something not addressed in the discussion of geographical dispersion below).
This contrasted greatly with the situation in northern Aleppo, where Turkey has played a very hands on role in all military and governance matters in the wake of 2016’s Operation Euphrates Shield. The late 2017 creation of the SNA was Turkey’s attempt at restructuring and centralizing Syria’s infamously fractured armed opposition. Turkey was able to carry this out given its role in shielding the pocket from the regime and HTS, its long time relationships with many of the rebel commanders via its National Intelligence Organization (MİT), and the fact that the autonomy of the factions and their commanders was largely preserved.
The thirty of so factions present in the Euphrates Shield area were divided into three legions, all ostensibly answering to the Ministry of Defense of the Turkish-backed Syrian Interim Government. The legions have remained in place ever since but many of the factions have changed their allegiances due to intra-SNA competition. What’s remained consistent is that key Turkish allies Furqat al-Sultan Murad and Furqat al-Hamzah have led the 2nd Legion, while the 3rd Legion has been dominated by al-Jabhah al-Shamiyah, the most independently powerful SNA faction.
Since its founding the SNA has taken part in Operation Olive Branch - Turkey’s 2018 invasion of the Afrin region - and Operation Peace Spring - Turkey’s 2019 invasion of northern al-Raqqah and al-Hasakah. Some of the SNA factions closest to Turkey were involved in recruiting fighters to serve as mercenary auxiliary forces in Turkey’s 2019 intervention in Libya and its support of Azerbaijan’s 2020 war on Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh. Additionally its been reported that Turkey has sent SNA fighters to guard Turkish sites in the Sahel and Central Africa, though this has not been forensically confirmed.
Below I’ve listed the primary 25 or so SNA factions in their order of battle, along with the names of their commanders and brief summaries of who they are and where they were active prior to December 2024. Some of this information is rather incomplete as there tends to be little published regarding the smaller factions. Overall it’s important to keep in mind that the most influential factions likely include: al-Jabhah al-Shamiyah, Furqat al-Sultan Murad, al-Quwwah al-Mushtarikah, Jaysh al-Islam, and Harakat al-Tahrir wa’l-Bina’.
1st Legion
Commander: Mu‘tazz Raslan (Jaysh al-Nukhbah Northern Sector)
2nd Division
Jaysh al-Nukhbah Northern Sector (‘Brigade 145’). Commander: Mu‘tazz Raslan, also commander of the SNA 1st Legion. Was once the northern branch of Idlib-based Jaysh al-Nukhbah, part of the CIA’s TOW program until 2017 under the name Jaysh al-Tahrir, but the Northern Sector appears to have operated independently since 2018. Active in the Bulbul and Sharran subdistricts of northern Afrin.
Brigade 113. Commander: Husam Bakour (“Abu al-Nour”). Previously operated in northern Aleppo under the name Jaysh al-Ahfad, a small faction reportedly created by Turkey in 2017 as a precursor to the SNA project. Reportedly present in Euphrates Shield region.
Liwa’ al-Sultan Mehmet al-Fatih (‘Brigade 131’). Commander: Doğan Süleyman. Ethnic Turkmen faction formed in Aleppo governorate in 2012. See my full length profile here.
Liwa’ al-Waqqas (‘Brigade 133’). Commander Sa’ad ‘Abbas. Formed in northern Aleppo in 2017 by formerly al-Jabhah al-Shamiyah affiliated elements. See my full length profile here.
Harakat al-Tahrir wa’l Bina’. Commander: Ahmad al-Hayyes, aka Abu Hatim Shaqra (Furqat Ahrar al-Sharqiyah)
Furqat Ahrar al-Sharqiyah (‘Division 15’). Commander: Ahmad al-Hayyes, aka Abu Hatim Shaqra. Faction created in 2016 by fighters displaced from Deir ez-Zour and from elsewhere in eastern Syria. It’s fighters were responsible for the murder of Kurdish politician Hevrin Khalaf in 2019, which combined with numerous other human rights abuses led to the group and its founder being sanctioned by the US government. Present in Afrin, central and eastern parts of Euphrates Shield, and central areas of the Peace Spring region. For more information on the faction and its founder see these profiles I compiled years ago.
Jaysh al-Sharqiyah (‘Brigade 146’). Commander: Hussein al-Hamadi. Made up of fighters displaced from eastern Syria. Active in Afrin, eastern Aleppo, and the Peace Spring region. Some more information in this piece I wrote in 2019 on the ‘eastern’ factions.
20th Division (‘Brigade 144’). Commander: Abu Barzan al-Sultani. Made up of fighters displaced from eastern Syria. Present in eastern Aleppo and the Peace Spring region. See Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi’s 2019 interview with a member for more information.
Suqour al-Sham Northern Sector (‘Brigade 142’). Commander: Abu Arab. Formerly the northern contingent of Idlib-based Islamist faction Suqour al-Sham, appears to have become functionally independent since the founding of the SNA. The majority of its fighters reportedly come from the Jebel al-Zawiyah region of Idlib. Active in eastern Aleppo.
2nd Legion
Commander: Fahim ‘Isa (Furqat al-Sultan Murad)
Furqat al-Sultan Murad (‘Division 21’, ‘Division 24’). Commander: Fehim Isa. Initially formed in the Aleppo governorate during 2013 as a brigade of ethnic Turkmen fighters, membership likely now includes a significant number of Arabs. A recipient of Turkish support for years, likely a factor in the group receiving TOW anti-tank missiles in 2015 as part of the CIA’s Operation Timber Sycamore. Sent fighters to Libya and Azerbaijan as part of Turkey’s SNA mercenary program. Operate a base at the Hawar Kilis Military Crossing on the Turkish border. Active in Afrin, the Euphrates Shield region, and around Ras al-‘Ain/Serê Kaniyê.
Liwa’ al-Shamal (‘Brigade 111’). Commander: Rami Qoujah, aka Mustafa al-Shuyoukhi. Formed in northern Aleppo in 2016, initially affiliated with Idlib-based Islamist faction Faylaq al-Sham. See my full length profile here.
al-Quwwah al-Mushtarikah. Alliance formed in 2023, co-commanded by Seyf Polat and Muhammad Jasim.
Furqat al-Hamzah (‘Division 22’). Commander: Seyf Polat, aka Abu Bakr. Initially formed in northern Aleppo, led by ethnic Turkmen and long time Turkish asset Seyf Polat. Was part of the US Department of Defense’s Train and Equip program in 2015/16. Sent fighters to Libya and Azerbaijan as part of Turkey’s SNA mercenary program. Sanctioned by the US in 2023 over widespread human rights abuses. Operate a base at the Hawar Kilis Military Crossing on the Turkish border. Active in Afrin, al-Bab, and Ras al-‘Ain/Serê Kaniyê.
Furqat al-Sultan Suleiman Shah (‘Division 28’). Commander: Muhammad Jasim, aka Abu ‘Amshah. Formed in 2016 within the context of Turkey’s Operation Euphrates Shield by a nucleus of fighters around commander Muhammad Jasim, an ethnic Turkmen from Hama governorate. Sent fighters to Libya and Azerbaijan as part of Turkey’s SNA mercenary program. Sanctioned by the US in 2023 over widespread human rights abuses. Operate a base at the Hawar Kilis Military Crossing on the Turkish border. Active in Afrin, particularly the Sheikh al-Hadid subdistrict, Euphrates Shield region, and on the front lines north of ‘Ain ‘Isa.
Furqat al-Mu’tasim (‘3rd Division’). Commander: al-Mu‘tasim ‘Abbas. Formed in northern Aleppo in 2015, initially received American support as part of the DoD’s Train and Equip program. See my full length profile here.
Jaysh al-Majd (‘Division 24’). Commander: Yasir ‘Abd al-Rahim. Relatively recent splinter from the 3rd Legion’s Faylaq al-Majd. Active in the al-Bab area.
Furqat al-Muntasir Billah (‘Division 25’). Commander: Firas Paşa. Ethnic Turkmen brigade founded in the Aleppo governorate in 2013. Active in the Euphrates Shield region.
Division 26
Maghawir al-Sham. Commander: Yousef al-Hamawi, aka Abu Suleiman. Merger of various splinters of Idlib-based Islamist faction Ahrar al-Sham. Some have been active in northern Aleppo since prior to the founding of the SNA, others fled Idlib due to disputes with HTS. Active in the Euphrates Shield region.
Ahrar al-Sham Eastern Sector. Commander Muhammad Abu Haidar Maskanah.
Abu al-‘Izz Ariha bloc. Commander ‘Ala’ Fahham, aka Abu al-‘Izz Ariha.
Faylaq al-Rahman (‘Division 26’). Commander: ‘Abd al-Nasir Shamir, aka Abu al-Nasir. Founded in the Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus in 2013. Displaced to northern Syria following the regime offensive and evacuation deals that ended the existence of the pocket in spring 2018. Active in Afrin - control former Asad regime military base ‘Brigade 135’ - and the Peace Spring region.
Division 27
Furqat al-Sultan Malikshah (‘Division 27’). Commander: Mahmoud al-Baz. Furqat al-Sultan Murad splinter group formed in 2020. Active in Afrin, Euphrates Shield, and Peace Spring regions.
Furqat Suqour al-Shamal (‘Division 27’). Commander: Hasan Hajj ‘Ali Khayriyah. Formed in 2016 as a splinter from Idlib-based Liwa’ Suqour al-Jabal, a CIA supported faction. Disbanded in 2024. See my full length profile here.
Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki (‘Division 19’). Commander: Ahmad Rizq. Islamist faction formed in western Aleppo in 2011. Bulk of the group entered SNA areas following an HTS offensive against it in early 2019, though many joined other factions such as Faylaq al-Majd. Later reconstituted itself and formally joined the SNA in 2024. Active in Afrin.
Faylaq al-Sham Northern Sector (‘Brigade 141’). Northern Aleppo contingent of the Idlib-based Islamist faction. Active in southern Afrin.
Special Forces Division. Commander: ‘Abdullah Halawah. Reportedly disbanded in 2021.
9th Division Special Forces (‘Brigade 143’). Commander: ‘Abd al-Nasir Jalal. Formed in Idlib governorate in 2013, was part of CIA-backed coalitions Syrian Revolutionaries Front and Harakat Hazm. Active in Jarabulus, the Afrin region, and the ‘Ain ‘Isa front.
3rd Legion
Commander: Muhammad Jamal Deiri (al-Furqah 51)
al-Jabhah al-Shamiyah (c. 2019: Divisions 31, 33). Commander: ‘Azzam Gharib, aka Abu al-‘Izz Saraqib. Formed in Aleppo city and northern Aleppo countryside in 2015 as a coalition of mostly Islamist factions present in the area, later reconstituted as an individual faction. At least initially many of its fighters were formerly affiliated with Liwa’ al-Tawhid and other early war factions native to northern Aleppo. Received support from CIA in 2015/16. The largest SNA faction in terms of manpower and most independent vis-a-vis Turkey. Includes a number of local subfactions within its ranks. Controls the A‘zaz region and Tell Abyad.
Division 34
al-Furqah 51. Commander: Muhammad Jamal Deiri. A faction formed in early 2016 in northern Aleppo. Present in the A‘zaz region. Other small local factions such as Fawj al-Mustafa and Liwa al-Salam operated within the ranks of Division 34 as well.
Jaysh al-Islam (Division 35). Commander: ‘Issam Buwaydani. Islamist faction formed in the Damascus suburb of Eastern Ghouta in 2013. Maintained a small presence in northern Syria, however the bulk of the group was displaced north following the regime offensive and evacuation deals that ended the existence of the Eastern Ghouta pocket in spring 2018.
Faylaq al-Majd (Division 36). Commander: Yamin Taljou. Formed in northern Aleppo and in Idlib in 2017 by Yamin Taljou, a Jaysh al-Islam-linked opposition figure. Active in Afrin and Euphrates Shield regions.
Liwa’ Samarqand (Division 37). Commander: Tha’ir al-Ma’rouf. Formed in northern Aleppo in 2016, initially as part of Furqat al-Hamzah. See my full length profile here.
112th Brigade (Division 37). Commander: ‘Abd al-Karim Qusoum. Previously operated in northern Aleppo under the name Jaysh al-Ahfad, a small faction reportedly created by Turkey in 2017 as a precursor to the SNA project. Active in Afrin, particularly around the town of Ba‘dinli.