This Week in Northern Syria [7.2025]

February 12-18: National Dialogue committee announced, Öcalan's letter reaches DAANES, al-Shar' visits Afrin, and more...

Notes to reader:

I’m still playing around with the newsletter sections - currently SCG news is divided between events occurring in former SNA/SIG areas and those occurring elsewhere. It’s a bit of a challenge given the currently amorphous administrative and security situation but I will try to solidify the format soon.

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On February 12th the SCG Presidency announced the creation of a seven person Preparatory Committee for the National Dialogue Conference, a so far vaguely outlined but greatly awaited assembly floated by HTS leadership that is to lay the groundwork for a new Syrian government. There is still no date as to when the conference will be held, as one of the committee members has said that there is no specified timeline to the entire process.

Members of the committee include:

• Hasan al-Daghaim: previously the head of the SNA’s Moral Guidance Department and a prominent opposition personality originally from Idlib; background in Islamic education and preaching; notably introduced Ahmad al-Shar‘ at the January 29th ‘Victory Conference’ where he was named President. (Twitter account)

• Maher ‘Alloush: A prominent opposition figure from Homs historically close to Ahrar al-Sham; was imprisoned in Sednaya from 2007-2012 for his opposition activity. (Twitter account)

• Muhammad Mastat: Formerly a political figure affiliated Faylaq al-Sham from Aleppo city; worked as a preacher in western Aleppo before working in development, education, and opposition politics in A‘zaz; took part in the HTS-led November offensive as a member of the General Command’s Public Relations team.

• Mustafa al-Mousa: A pharmacist from Idlib; formerly a member of the SSG’s health committee and the president of its General Shura Council.

• Yousef al-Hajar (Abu al-Bara’ Shuhail): a founding member of Jabhat al-Nusrah from Deir ez-Zour; previously worked an a member of the SSG’s General Shura Council; was close to prominent Jabhat al-Nusrah/HTS figure Abu Maria Qahtani, an Iraqi national who was assassinated in April 2024.

• Hind Qabawat: Long time opposition and women’s rights activism involved in a number of civil society organizations as well as Etilaf-affiliated Syrian Negotiating Commission; born in India but from a Damascene Christian family, possesses both Syrian and Canadian citizenship. (Twitter account)

• Huda Atasi: An activist from Homs involved in a number of different aid and civil society organizations; an activist by trade.

In terms of political alignment the Committee breaks down into:

• two HTS/SSG figures (al-Hajar and al-Mousa)

• two affiliates of closely allied Islamist militant factions Ahrar al-Sham and Faylaq al-Sham (‘Alloush and Mastat)

• an SNA-affiliated figure with a conservative Islamic background (al-Daghaim)

• a liberal Christian who heads a women’s organization and was formerly part Etilaf’s negotiating team (Qabawat)

• one (as far as we know) politically unaffiliated member of multiple aid and civil society organizations (Atasi)

Demographically the committee consists of five men and two women; six (Arab) Sunnis and one Christian; one Damascene, one Aleppine, two Idlibis, two Homsis, and one from Deir ez-Zour.

al-Shar‘ with the Preparatory Committee. L-R: Qabawat, al-Atasi, al-Daghaim, ‘Alloush, Mastat, al-Shar‘, Mudhhar al-Wais, al-Hajar, al-Mousa

Overall the committee skews towards what has the opposition’s conservative Sunni base, politically weighted in the direction of HTS, and geographically omitting the south, the coast, and the northeast. Unsurprisingly this makeup has provoked criticism from many sectors of society over issues of political, demographic, and geographic representation, in addition to the committee not having any authority of its own but rather existing in an advisory capacity to the Presidency.

The Preparatory Committee held its first press conference on February 13th during which a statement was read vaguely outlining the purpose of the future National Dialogue Conference and the committee’s relationship to it:

The conference seeks to discuss social, political, economic and governance issues, laying solid foundations for a future based on national consensus, justice, and reform.

The conference will include specialized workshops led by professionals to discuss the issues raised in depth, in addition to providing an open space to raise any other topics that participants deem necessary to determine the path of the national solution.

Speaking to SANA al-Daghaim elaborated that

Regarding the representation of the governorates in the conference, a meeting will be held with citizens in each Syrian governorate to determine its specificities and diversity, and to choose national figures capable of representing the interests of each governorate, in a manner consistent with the interest of the nation in general, and there is no doubt that the committee will not seek to sectarianize society, or sectarian quotas, this is completely unacceptable, but it will take into account this diversity, so that each governorate’s representation approaches its general image.

The committee’s work is to manage the national dialogue, organizing, arranging and facilitating it, and to help citizens and members of the conference reach the desired results…

[the Presidency has] …a desire to involve the results and recommendations of the dialogue in the constitutional construction of the country…

Responding to a question from Anadolu Agency al-Daghaim ruled out the participation of the SDF or any affiliated political entities in the National Dialogue Conference on the basis of the SDF being a military actor that has not yet accepted integration into the new government’s Ministry of Defense, and the the SDF not being representative of the eastern provinces. Instead the committee said it would be in communication with individuals from al-Hasakah, Deir ez-Zour, and al-Raqqah, including from the provinces Kurdish populations.

No parties of any affiliation have been invited to partake in the process and in comments to SANA al-Daghaim implied that parties will have no role in Syrian politics until a new law regulating them has been past. Additionally al-Daghaim told Anadolu that the PYD should be disbanded altogether due to its affiliation with the SDF, but that seems to be an issue for a later date - after Damascus-Qamishli negotiations are settled.

Both the DAANES and the SDC published statements critiquing the announcement of the Preparatory Committee on the 15th, with the former implying that it is “ignoring or excluding the will and decision of about five million Syrians in our regions” (a quite high population estimate), while latter stated that

this committee was formed from a single political spectrum and orientation, which violates the principle of fair and comprehensive representation of all components of the Syrian people.

This formed committee does not represent Syrians of all sects and diversities, and there is a clear exclusion of political, societal and national forces, who constitute a large and significant percentage of the composition of Syrian society, and their exclusion is a blatant violation of the principle of national partnership.

PYD leader Saleh Muslim told al-Arabiya that without representation the SDC and DAANES would not be obliged to obey decisions made at the conference. Additionally, the DAANES’ main Kurdish rival the ENKS, as well as two other Kurdish parties, critiqued the council for not having appointed a Kurdish representative.

Starting on the 16th members of the Committee began holding consultative dialogue sessions in provincial capitals around Syria. According to a statement given to SANA by Maher ‘Alloush the sessions aim “to listen to citizens’ opinions and proposals on the national issues raised, to transform them into workshops during the conference, ensuring real interaction between the various segments of society.” Four such sessions were held across northwestern Syria throughout the week:

• 02/16/25: Homs

• 02/17/25: Latakia

• 02/17/25: Tartous

• 02/18/25: Idlib

• 02/18/25: Hama

Given the membership of the committee and its lack of actually mandate authority, it appears that this entire National Dialogue process has been set up in a way that allows Ahmad al-Shar‘ and the senior HTS/SSG cadre around him to steer the direction of the future Syrian state. This has been painted over and aided to some degree with convenient discourse clearly influenced by the neoliberal NGO sphere’s aversion to organized political parties in favor of unmediated, atomized individuals. Another issue is that it’s not clear how people are being chosen to attend the ongoing dialogue sessions, and whether these are actually representative of provinces as a whole or rather of the local parochial ‘notables.’ Of course much still remains to be seen with regards to the process, particularly in terms of the ongoing Damascus/SDF talks and how the committee will approach the areas still under the control of the latter.