This Week in Northern Syria [13.2025]
March 26 - April 1: a new government in Damascus, the Sheikh Maqsoud deal, and more...
As mentioned in my last post I was unable to put out a full issue covering the week of March 26th - April 1st. This is a brief summary of several major events that occurred during that period. The newsletter will be back to its regular schedule later this week.
03/27/25: CNN reported that the Trump administration “has terminated a majority of its funding for… the White Helmets (Syrian Civil Defense), according to internal documents and the organization.” This was part of the broader USAID cuts, ending funding for SCD “firefighting, search and rescue, and community resilience work.”
03/27/25: The SDF published a video detailing three alleged new Turkish bases in eastern Aleppo: in the hills above the Qaraqozak bridge, on the Euphrates shore line 1.5km northwest of the bridge, and in the village of Jubb Hasan Agha. The video only includes footage of the first location.
03/27/25: The Aleppo provincial media outlet reported that maintenance crews had finally reached the al-Khafsah water station after four months of clashes between the SDF and SNA on the nearby Tishrin dam and Deir Hafir fronts resulted in damage and a substantial decrease in water provision. The station - located 25km southwest of the Tishrin dam on the western bank of the Euphrates serves both the Aleppo city and Manbij areas. This deployment of service workers reportedly comes as part of the deal reached between the SCG and SDF the previous month.
03/28/25: The SDF’s TOL units arrested a suspected IS member in the al-Shaddadi region of southern al-Hasakah, reportedly involved in smuggling operations out of al-Houl camp.
03/28/25: The SCG Presidency appointed Usamah al-Rifa‘i to the position of Grand Mufti of the Syrian Arab Republic, tasked with supervising the work of the newly named fifteen member Supreme Fatwa Council. Al-Rifa‘i is the son of ‘Abd al-Karim, founder of the Damascene Zaid group which took an “approach [described] as being ‘halfway between traditional Sufi brotherhoods and the Muslim Brothers’, because its goal was ‘the development of the individual in terms of religious knowledge, spirituality, and some [social and political] thought’” (Pierret, 58). Usamah al-Rifa‘i lived in exile in Saudi Arabia from 1980-1994 due to tensions with the regime relating to the ongoing Islamist insurgency, and left the country again for Turkey in 2012 over his support for the uprising. Since then he has headed the Instanbul-based Syrian Islamic Council. While undoubtedly a conservative, al-Rifa‘i is from far outside the Salafist-jihadist milieu of which President al-Shar‘ once resided within and published anti-Salafi theological tracts in the 2000s. For more on the al-Rifa‘i family and the Zaid group see Thomas Pierret’s Religion and State in Syria: The Sunni Ulama from Coup to Revolution.
03/29/25: President al-Shar‘ announced the formation of the new Syrian government, via the powers vested in him though the ‘Constitutional Declaration’ signed two week prior. The 23 member cabinet “is made up of several independent technocrats with HTS figures retaining all the major portfolios (foreign affairs, defence, interior) and includes representatives of religious and ethnic minorities, as well as ministers who served under the previous regime.” Minister of Foreign Affairs As‘ad al-Shaibani and Minister of Defense Murhaf Abu Qasrah both maintained their positions. The office of Prime Minister seems to have been abolished with al-Shar‘ maintaining all executive power and former Prime Minister Muhammad al-Bashir moving to head the new Ministry of Energy (a combination of the former Electricity, Oil and Mineral Resources, and Water ministries). Former General Intelligence Service Anas al-Khattab was moved to the position of Minister of the Interior.
Notably controversial Minister of Justice Shadi al-Waisi was removed in favor of another HTS figure, while the president’s brother Maher al-Shar‘ was removed from the Minister of Health seat and replaced with a non-affialiated surgeon. Director of Syrian Civil Defense Ra‘id al-Salih was appointed head of the new Ministry for Emergency and Disaster Management. The new government includes seven formerly HTS/SSG affiliated individuals, five pre-2011 government officials, and demographically breaks down to nineteen Sunni Arabs, one ‘Alawi (Ya‘rub Badr), one Christian (Hind Qabawat; the sole woman in the government), one Druze (Amjad Badr), and one Kurd (Muhammad Turko).
Meanwhile DAANES published a statement rejecting the new government on charges that one party was “monopolizing power and excluding Syrian components and sects from the political process,” adding that it will not be implement any decisions made by it.
For more on the new ministers see: Enab Baladi, al-Monitor, Financial Times, New Arab, Middle East Eye, Aaron Zelin’s collection of official biographies,
03/29/25: Two Asayish members were reportedly killed in combat on the Tishrin dam front. Meanwhile the SDF reported on the deaths of two of its fighters on the Deir Hafir front to the south, earlier in the week.
03/29/25: Iraq repatriated 168 families - 681 individuals - previously held in al-Houl camp.
03/31/25: Eid al-Fitr celebrations commenced around Syria marking the end of the month of Ramadan. Prayers were performed at the Presidential Palace and the nearby Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Damascus, the former attended by President al-Shar‘, symbolically significant given that this was the first Eid celebrated since the fall of the regime and the ushering in of a new Islamist government.
04/01/25: Syria’s Assyrian/Syriac community celebrated Akitu or ‘Assyrian New Year’ in various towns and villages of al-Hasakah governorate.
04/01/25: An agreement was reached between the committee assigned by the SCG Presidency with implementing the February SCG/SDF deal and the DAANES Civil Council for the al-Sheikh Maqsoud and al-Ashrafiyah neighborhoods of Aleppo city regarding its integration into SCG-administered Aleppo.
The fourteen point document reads:
The Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh neighborhoods, which have a Kurdish majority, will have appointed administrators, and the protection and respect for the social and cultural privacy of the neighborhoods will be activated.
The provisions of this civil agreement will apply once the Kurdish and central Syrian sides agree on a sustainable text.
The Ministry of Interior will coordinate with internal security forces to ensure the protection of the residents of the neighborhoods and prevent any attacks or threats to their lives.
Armed manifestations in the neighborhoods will be prohibited, limiting weapons to the hands of the internal security forces affiliated with the Ministry of Interior in the neighborhoods.
Opening crossings between the neighborhoods while keeping the main barriers under the supervision of the internal security affiliated with the Ministry of Interior of the Syrian state and the internal security of the neighborhoods.
The withdrawal of military forces affiliated with the SDF will occur gradually from the neighborhoods to their concentration area in northeastern Syria.
Establishing an internal security center in each of the Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhoods.
Prevention of pursuing any individuals pursued prior to the agreement, provided they “do not have blood on their hands” of Syrians.
Forming a coordination committee to facilitate movement and transportation between the city of Aleppo and northeastern Syria.
Establishing technical committees to implement the agreement on the ground.
Coordination between civil institutions to provide services to the neighborhoods without discrimination against other neighborhoods in Aleppo, through municipal teams present in the neighborhoods.
Discussing the fate of detainees from both sides in Aleppo province and exchanging all prisoners captured after liberation.
Granting the neighborhoods the right to fair representation in the Aleppo Provincial Council, chambers of commerce, industry, and other sectors, in accordance with existing laws.
Preserving the existing service, administrative, educational, municipal institutions, and local councils in the neighborhoods until the joint committees agree on a sustainable solution.
The signees include Director of the Aleppo Security Directorate Muhammad ‘Abd al-Ghani, SCG representative Mas‘oud Battal and co-chairs of the DAANES local council Nouri Sheikho and Hefin Suleiman.
In a short interview published by the provincial media channel ‘Abd al-Ghani emphasized that prisoner swaps and military withdrawal would be the first steps to talk place, followed by security integration, with the administrative and service portfolios to be settled last in a gradual manner.
The latest UNHCR data on post-Dec 2024 returnees:
The Syria Report: “Arab Belt Farmers Sell Land Due to Fears of Losing Ownership”
The Arab Belt area stretches between Qamishli and Al-Malikiyah in the Hassakeh governorate. It was originally inhabited by Syrian Kurds, many of whom were registered as “foreigners” in Syria since the late 1960s, and were deprived of their civil rights. The lands of the Kurds were confiscated and redistributed to Arab farmers from the Al-Walda tribe, whose lands had been submerged by the waters of the Euphrates River in 1974, following the construction of the Euphrates Dam and Lake Assad in the Raqqa and Aleppo governorates. These displaced people, relocated from the flooded areas to the Arab Belt, became known as “Ghamr” farmers. In some other cases, lands belonging to “foreign Kurds” were granted to farmers from the rural areas of Aleppo and Hama, even though their lands were not submerged. In all cases, the Arab Socialist Baath Party used the Arab Belt project to implement demographic engineering in northern Hassakeh along the Syrian-Turkish border. The Ministry of Defence also appropriated large portions of Kurdish land to establish state-run farms, which remain contested today between the AANES and Kurdish farmers who are demanding their return.