This Week in Northern Syria [10B.2025]
March 5-11: a quadrilateral meeting in Amman, clashes around al-Sheikh Maqsoud, and more...
See the first part of this week’s newsletter covering the SCG/SDF agreement signed on March 10th here. As mentioned previously I have made this entire issue of the newsletter free to the public. To gain access to these detailed briefings going forward considering becoming a paid subscriber.
DAANES/SDF
03/05/25: The Asayish reportedly seized 20k rounds of Kalashnikov ammunition being smuggled via truck at the al-Tabqah crossing with SCG territory.
03/05/25: Responding to a question form BBC correspondent Jiyar Gol regarding rumored communication between the SDF and Israel Mazloum ‘Abdi said “we welcome support from anyone… we welcome anyone in the world who can help support our rights and protect out achievements. If they can prevent attacks against us and stop the killing of our people, both civilians and forces, we welcome that and appreciate it. Israel is a force with influence in the USE, the West, and the region.”
03/07/25: Mazloum ‘Abdi and a Coalition representative held a meeting in al-Raqqah with military and security commanders in addition to “sheikhs and notables of the cities of al-Tabqa and al-Raqqa,” where they discussed ongoing negotiations with the SCG in addition to local security and administrative developments.
03/07/25: A young woman from al-Qamishli was reportedly killed during clashes between SCG security forces and insurgents in Latakia city, where she was attending university.
03/09/25: Clashes broke out between the SDF and unidentified SCG-aligned forces on the edge of the SDF-controlled al-Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood in Aleppo city, reportedly resulting in the injuring of three Asayish members and unconfirmed casualties on the SCG side. Geolocated footage shows a vehicle on fire at an SDF position at the southern corner of the pocket. Pro-SDF outlets reported that the attack came unprovoked while pro-SCG sources said that the issue began with the SDF/Asayish erecting a flying checkpoint just outside their area of control. Meanwhile SCG Ministry of Defense spokesman Hasan ‘Abd al-Ghani simply told SANA that its forces repelled an SDF attack. Tensions appear to have dissipated by the announcement of the SCG/SDF deal the following day. Just two days earlier a Turkish drone strike was reported targeting the SDF-controlled pocket.
03/10/25: A Turkish drone strike reportedly killed a child and injured two others in the Sarrin region of eastern Aleppo.
03/10/25: The Peoples’ Democratic Council, the DAANES legislative body, “issued the general budget law for the fiscal year 2025,” reportedly a 39 article document that expects a budget deficit.
03/11/25: Journalist Jiyar Gol posted a photo to Twitter appearing to show Mazloum ‘Abdi aboard a US militant helicopter on his way to sign the March 10th agreement with President al-Shar‘.
03/11/25: The SDF reported continued Turkish and possibly SNA drone strikes and shelling of the eastern Aleppo countryside around the Qara Qozaq and Tishrin dam fronts. The ceasefire included as part of the SCG/SDF agreement nominally includes SNA groups as on paper they answer to the Syrian Ministry of Defense, however in reality it’s unlikely the SCG has any control over what happens on these fronts manned by the SNA and overseen by Turkey. Heavt clashes between the two sides were reported just the day before the agreement was signed. Meanwhile Turkey clearly does not view this ceasefire as relevant to its anti-SDF air campaign.
Northern Aleppo
03/05/25: Aleppo governor ‘Azzam Gharib received a delegation from Tadef to discuss service provision and infrastructure rehabilitation in largely destroyed town that sat for years on the eastern Aleppo front line between the SNA and regime forces.
03/06/25: NPA published a video allegedly showing the aftermath of digging carried out by Furqat al-Hamzah members between the villages of Kimar and Soughanah (or al-Basaliyah) in southwestern Afrin, in order to scrap landline cables. These two villages sat on opposite sides of the SNA/SDF front lines prior to December 2024.
03/06/25: A man was reportedly killed and other injured in a mine explosion that took place outside the town of al-Ziyarah, formerly located on the southern edge of the SDF’s Tell Rifa‘at/al-Shahba’ pocket.
03/06/25: An untold number of SNA forces from a number of different factions and armed tribesmen mobilized and left for Syria’s coastal provinces to take part in the ongoing counter-insurgency campaign. Two days later the SCG’s General Security forces reportedly arrested members of Furqat al-Hamzah over violations committed against civilians.
03/11/25: A‘zaz Media Center raised the subject of identification cards issued by the formerly SIG-affiliated Local Councils of northern Aleppo and eastern Syria, now reportedly not recognized by the Syrian Bar Association as official documents. Many of those displaced to northern Syria over the course of the war lost possession of their state-issued identification documents and were forced to rely on these interim ID cards printed by the Turkish-backed administration.
Syrian Caretake Government
03/06/25: Reuters and The Syria Report reported that Syria had begun receiving diesel shipments from Russia via US-sanctioned tankers, “as Syria seeks new oil suppliers after the cessation of oil imports from Iran following the fall of the Syrian regime.” The same day Syria received a shipment of newly printed currency from Russia, seemingly the first delivery of Syrian currency printed in Russia after the fall of the Asad regime.
03/09/25: SCG officials took part in a high level quadrilateral meeting in Amman along with representatives of Turkey, Iraq, and Jordan, as part of a new cooperative structure for regional security designed by Turkey. The foreign ministers, defense ministers, and heads of national intelligence organizations of the four countries met to “discuss cooperation in the areas of security, combating terrorism and organised crime, as well as regional developments.” The Jordanian Foreign Minister published an 11 point document afterwards emphasizing support for Syria and its territorial integrity, the need for Israel to respect the 1974 disengagement agreement, cooperation against IS and other terrorist organizations (though it does not make specific reference to the PKK or related groups), economic cooperation, and the need to secure conditions for “the safe and sustainable return of Syrian refugees to their homeland.” A second quadrilateral meeting is to be held in Turkey next month.
03/11/25: The SCG announced the reopening of the ‘dirt bridge’ connecting Deir ez-Zour city to SDF areas across the river, after a month of repairs.
Islamic State
03/05/25: IS claimed an IED attack occurring the previous Sunday, targeting an SDF vehicle on the al-Kharafi road (running between al-Shaddadi and Deir ez-Zour city).
03/06/25: A CENTCOM/SDF joint operation reportedly resulted in the arrest of IS cell leader in al-Shuhail, central Deir ez-Zour. The same day NPA reported that the Asayish had carried out a three day security campaign targeting the ‘seven villages’ region (former regime-controlled pocket on the left bank of the Euphrates), arresting “dozens of people accused of belonging to the Islamic State, cells dealing with the Assad regime, and former Iranian factions.”
03/07/25: The SDF reported engaging with IS forces attempting to infiltrate their territory in eastern Deir ez-Zour from the other side of the river, resulting in IS casualties. The following day unidentified assailants carried out three separate attacks against the SDF the central Deir ez-Zour towns of Abrihah, al-Shuhail, and al-Sabhah.
03/09/25: IS claimed two attacks against oil tankers in their al-Naba’ magazine, one targeting three allegedly belonging to the al-Qaterji group in the Abu Khashab area, and a second targeting a DAANES tanker on the al-Hasakah/al-Raqqah road.
03/10/25: The SDF’s TOL unit reportedly arrested a senior IS leader in al-Busayrah, central Deir ez-Zour, during a joint operation with Coalition forces.
03/11/25: IS claimed an attack occurring the previous Thursday (March 6th) targeting an SDF commander in al-Hisan, western Deir ez-Zour, reportedly injuring him and a companion.
Turkey
03/06/25: In an interview with FT Foreign Minister and former MIT chief Hakan Fidan told the paper that he estimates the SDF fields 65,000 fighters, 2,000 of whom are PKK members and “up to 5,000 from their Syrian affiliates,” presumably meaning the YPG/YPJ. Speaking on the time Turkey has given the SCG to negotiate with the SDF Fidan said “Ultimately, we want to give them a chance to take ownership of the problem.”
Other
03/06/25: The UK removed sanctions placed on 24 different Syrian entities including “six state-owned commercial banks…, ten companies involved in Syria’s oil and gas sector” and the Syrian Arab Airlines, while unfreezing Syrian central bank assets. The following day Switzerland also “lifted certain sanctions against Syria’s energy and transport sector.”
03/06/25: The UK claimed responsibility for a February 25th airstrike that reportedly killed a Hurras al-Din member in Jarabulus.
03/06/25: Iraqi National Security Advisor Qasim al-‘Araji told France24 that USAID cuts are obstructing Iraqi efforts to fully repatriate its citizens held in al-Houl camp, as these people are typically moved to aid-assisted camps inside Iraq.
Miscellaneous
Al-Majalla published a full transcript of an interview conducted with SDF commander Mazloum ‘Abdi following the signing of the SCG/SDF agreement.
Reuters interviewed President Ahmad al-Shar‘ on a wide range of topics just prior to the signing of the SCG/SDF agreement.
FT’s recent profile of al-Shar‘:
Stepping off the elevator in his military greens, Sharaa knocked on the front door of the flat. The Suleiman family had only recently moved into the apartment after it had been assigned to them by the Assad regime. Now, they were throwing belongings into boxes and bags, trying to leave as quickly as possible.
They were startled to see the man who had become Syria’s de facto leader. “Sharaa gently told them, ‘Don’t rush. Take your time. But this is my family’s house, and we have many memories here, so we’d like it back now,’” an associate of Sharaa’s said, in an account later confirmed by a neighbour. Sharaa didn’t raise his voice and “gave them ample time to pack up and leave”, the neighbour told me.
Many Syrians want Sharaa to succeed because the alternative is too bleak to ponder. But since arriving in Damascus, he has conducted hundreds of meetings with foreign officials, diplomats, civil society groups, businessmen, prominent members of the diaspora and others. He is taking advice from the analysts, officials and diplomats he’s been meeting with for years in Idlib, as well as those hardliners that still populate his inner circle. Among dozens of people I’ve spoken to who’ve been in those meetings, including some who have long opposed Sharaa, the consensus has been optimistic until recently. He was repeatedly described to me as: “extremely bright”, “cunning”, “well-versed in regional history”, “well-read”, “a good listener” and, most frequently, “pragmatic”. But, in recent weeks, another word has begun to creep in: “strongman”.
REACH’s ‘Area-based assessment’ of Tell Tamer:
HHs in Tel Tamer face unreliable water access due to damaged infrastructure and poor pipeline maintenance. Many rely on costly private water trucking, emphasizing the need for sustainable water solutions and infrastructure rehabilitation.
Limited livelihood opportunities and rising costs prevent many HHs from meeting their basic needs. Limited employment opportunities, skill mismatches, and restricted access to financial services and business inputs further constrain income generation, highlighting the need for vocational training and small business support to enhance resilience.
Electricity shortages disrupt essential services, economic activities, and HH well-being. Frequent outages and reliance on expensive alternatives, such as private generators, highlight the need for grid rehabilitation, maintenance support, and expanded access to sustainable energy sources like solar power.
