Weekend notes
A 2017-2024 HTS timeline, newly discovered Coalition outpost in al-Hasakah, and former SAA bases in NES
HTS timeline
I just finished reading Patrick Haenni and Jerome Drevon’s Transformed by the People: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s Road to Power in Syria which offers a detailed and convincing account of HTS’s transition from jihadism to *something else*. I plan on writing something more in depth on the book or at least the topics it addresses soon. In the meantime I drew up a basic timeline of events relating to HTS and Idlib, bookended by the December 2016 fall of Aleppo city to regime forces and HTS’s December 2024 entrance into Damascus. It’s far from complete - largely focused on the factional conflicts and structural developments through and within which HTS established local hegemony and reshaped itself.
Jan 2017: Formation of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a merger of Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (ex-Jabhat al-Nusrah), Jaysh al-Ahrar (Ahrar al-Sham splinter c. Dec 2016), Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki, and others.
July 2017: HTS successful offensive against Ahrar al-Sham greatly diminishes the latter’s power in Idlib. Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki withdraws from HTS in protest.
Oct 2017: The Turkish Armed Forces established eleven observation posts inside Idlib (and adjacent areas) as part of an agreement reached with Russia in Astana.
Nov 2017: Formation of the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), the HTS-overseen civilian administration of ‘Greater Idlib.’
Feb 2018: Formation of Hurras al-Din, a loosely-organized HTS splinter group still loyal to al-Qa‘idah.
Summer 2018: Formation of the Administration of the Liberated Areas, SSG local councils aimed at disempowering independent local councils, local rule by militant factions including ‘local sections’ of HTS.
Aug 2018: Jabhat Tahrir Suriya (Ahrar al-Sham and Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki) and Jaysh al-Ahrar join al-Jabhah al-Wataniyah lil-Tahrir (NLF), which becomes the main alliance of non-HTS, non-international jihadist factions in Idlib.
Jan 2019: ‘Decisive phase’ of HTS vs. Ahrar al-Sham conflict: the former takes full control of Idlib with the support of the Turkistan Islamic Party and Faylaq al-Sham neutrality. Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki is kicked out of Idlib/W. Aleppo to SNA-controlled areas.
Feb 2019: The SSG holds its first legislative assembly.
Feb 2019: Western NGOs begin pulling out of Idlib in response to HTS takeover (and its listing as a terrorist organization by various countries and international bodies).
Mar 2019: HTS establishes its High Fatwa Council to centralize religious rulings.
Dec 2019: The regime launches its “Dawn of Idlib 2” offensive along the southern and eastern borders of the province. The offensive temporary stops as a result of a Russian/Turkish ceasefire, though restarts by late January with regime eventually capture most of the M5 highway (Hama/Aleppo).
Feb 2020: Turkey reinforces its observation posts and later officially intervenes against regime forces under the name ‘Operation Spring Shield,’ reverse regime advances around Saraqib. Approximately 10-12,000 Turkish reinforcements arrive in Idlib, establishing dozens of new outposts.
Mar 2020: Ceasefire agreement reached between Russia and Turkey with agreement of joint patrols to be implemented on the M4 highway (Latakia/Aleppo). Front lines largely frozen for ensuing four and a half years, while surrounded Turkish observation points now in regime-controlled territory are later withdrawn.
May 2020: HTS distances jihadi faction Ansar al-Tawhid from Hurras al-Din through increased material support, which later joins the HTS-led al-Fath al-Mubin operations room.
June 2020: HTS launches large scale attack on Hurras al-Din over the latter’s intentions to reopen fronts with the regime, essentially neutering it going forward.
July 2020: Russian-Turkish joint patrols are briefly implemented in spite of protests.
Oct 2020: HTS cracks down of international jihadi factions Junoud al-Sham and Jund Allah.
2021: Proliferation of shopping malls (some funded by HTS-linked investors) in border towns.
Mar 2021: HTS sponsors 2011 revolution anniversary events for the first time.
Late 2021: Abolition of Markaz al-Falah (SSG morality police)
June 2022: al-Julani/Ahmad al-Shar‘ visits Druze villages in Idlib.
June 2022: HTS temporarily invades southern Afrin in attack targeting al-Jabhah al-Shamiyah and Jaysh al-Islam. Turkey intervenes forcing HTS back to Idlib.
July 2022: Ahmad al-Shar‘ visits Christian villages in Idlib.
Oct 2022: The second HTS attack vs al-Jabhah al-Shamiyah and allies in Afrin, this time with significant support from other SNA factions though similarly resulting in Turkey stepping in to preserve the independence of SNA areas from HTS.
Feb 2023: Turkish/Syrian earthquake kills thousands in Afrin and Idlib, HTS dispatches emergency response teams into SNA-controlled Afrin.
Mar 2023: HTS intervenes in Afrin over ‘Newroz killings,’ Ahmad al-Shar‘ meets with families of Kurdish victims.
Dec 2023: Shura Council ratifies a public morality law in response to increasing open and mixed public spaces in Idlib, an initiative led by SSG and local elites rather than HTS leadership.
Late 2023: Internal purges of dozens of HTS members including high ranking cadre, ostensibly over charges of collaborating with US Coalition.
Feb 2024: Hirak protests against HTS breakout over earlier purge, torture cases, detentions.
Aug 2024: Hirak protests subside after mix of cooption, repression, exhaustion.
Nov 2024: HTS-led Operation Deterrence of Aggression launched in western Aleppo.
A small Coalition outpost I just discovered south of al-Hasakah
While looking into former Syrian regime bases in northeast Syria I stumbled across this facility that clearly belongs to one of the international Coalition members - either US, UK, or France - with ground forces in northeast Syria (note the beige tent seen at other bases). For a list of known US bases prior to this years partial downsizing, see here.
Pre-war Syrian Army bases in northeast Syria
Prior to the outbreak of the war only one of the Syrian Arab Army’s 13 divisions, the 17th, was stationed in eastern Syria. This light military presence is a clear indication of strategic priority at the time: most of the army was situated in the vicinity of the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, the Lebanese border, and Damascus. The 17th was reportedly established as a half-strength reserve unit, based just outside al-Raqqah while maintaining several bases for constituent brigades and regiments in northern al-Raqqah, Deir ez-Zour, and al-Hasakah.
Below is a map showing the six Syrian Army bases that existed in the northeast prior to 2011 (apart from those belonging to the Border Guard Forces’ 5th Regiment, also stationed in the region). At least five of these appear to have been affiliated with the 17th Division, while the details are a little hazy regarding #6. The fate of these bases and the units that were stationed in them over the course of the war varies significant.
17th Division (north of al-Raqqah city): Besieged by opposition forces soon after they had captured the city from the regime in March 2013. The siege ended over a year later when the Islamic State overrun the base in July 2014, leading to the flight of hundreds of soldiers to the 93rd Brigade and the execution of those caught by the jihadis. Today parts of the base are used by the SDF and/or Asayish, with Coalition forces occasionally making an appearance.
93rd Armored Brigade (‘Ain ‘Isa): Captured by the Islamic State in August 2014 , leading to the death or disappearance of hundreds of soldiers. The YPG captured the base with Coalition air support in June 2015 and it has remained in SDF hands ever since.
137th Mechanized Brigade (Deir ez-Zour): Appears to have been at least partially captured by IS around 2015, though later retaken. Part of the besieged regime enclave in Deir ez-Zour until the 2017 Badiyah offensive that broke the encirclement.
121st Artillery Regiment (al-Mailabiyah): Captured by IS in July 2014, who seized numerous weapons systems in the process. Was captured by the SDF in November 2015 as part of an offensive in the direction of al-Shaddadi to the south.
123rd Artillery Regiment (Jabal Kawkab): Remained in regime hands as an enclave over the course of the war until December 2024, now controlled by the SDF.
154th Artillery or 54th Special Forces Regiment (Tartab): Reports vary as to what unit this belonging to and whether they were affiliated with the 4th Division, Special Forces Command, or 17th Division prior to 2011. Remained in regime hands as part of the southern al-Qamishli enclave over the course of the war until December 2024, now controlled by the SDF.
Below: satellite imagery of the six bases c. 2011-13
Update: coincidentally the YPG published a graduation video filmed at the 121st Artillery Regiment at almost exactly the same moment this post was uploaded