What the HTS governance legacy in Idlib says about today
A not-quite review of Haenni and Drevon's Transformed by the People
Much of the discourse regarding Syria’s one year old government revolves around what goes on inside the head of Ahmad al-Shar‘. Does he plan on giving up power once he deems the transitional phase done? Will he hold elections in the future, meaning democratic elections in which Syria’s entire adult populace is given the ability to choose its own government? Is he secretly still loyal to al-Qa‘idah and is just biding time before unveiling a Taliban-esque government? Does his power slightly diminish every time someone so-called-‘Islamic’-States him by defiantly calling him Abu Muhammad al-Julani instead of using his legal name? Only time will give us the answer to these questions.
What we do have to go off is his track record: one year as Syrian president, roughly eight years ruling Greater Idlib as commander of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, five and a half as commander of al-Qa‘idah’s Syrian franchise Jabhat al-Nusrah and his previous experience as a jihadi insurgent and US detainee in Iraq. As is evident from the title, Patrick Haenni and Jerome Drevon’s Transformed by the People: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s Road to Power in Syria addresses the second item on the al-Shar‘ CV. The book is based on the authors’ field work inside Idlib between 2019 and 2024, including interviews with al-Shar‘ and other key figures within the organization, in addition to other local actors ranging from supportive, to neutral, to opposed to HTS rule. Haenni and Drevon trace the path al-Shar‘ and HTS took in the period bookended by the December 2016 fall of opposition-held Aleppo and the December 2024 fall of Asad’s rule in Damascus.
They convincingly argue that al-Shar‘ and HTS abandoned the project of salafi-jihadism during this period of retrenchment, using what the authors term “deradicalization” and “relocalization” to consolidate its rule and build hegemony over Idlib with the intention of eventually mounting a coordinated challenge to the former regime when it deemed the time right. This moment came last November, though it’s unlikely al-Shar‘ himself foresaw how quickly and completely the Asad regime would collapse. Since then, al-Shar‘ has ruled Syria in a manner than significantly echoes HTS’s track record in Idlib as laid out and analyzed by Haenni and Drevon.
In summary, this is an authoritarian system that prioritizes maintaining close control of the military and security portfolios while being willing to delegate significant aspects of governance to figures from outside the HTS milieu, including members of minority communities. Those brought into government are independent of potentially rival political projects. Independent political projects don’t legally exist as the government has yet to approve legislation regulating party life, leaving society formally depoliticized. This regime seeks to generate and sustain legitimacy through international recognition and a pro-business economic policy intended to attract Syrian and foreign capital from abroad. It avoids articulating an ideological platform apart from a vague Syrian nationalism imbued with references to its revolutionary legitimacy, dovetailing with a bottom-up Sunni populism which celebrates the new regime for bringing down the old one and returning Syria to majoritarian rule.
Haenni and Drevon argue that Tahrir al-Sham’s evolution was not pre-planned or based on a new coherent doctrine developed by the organization, but rather it was a silent “transformation [that] stemmed from a series of tactical choices that gradually took on a strategic dimension.”1 Clearly Ahmad al-Shar‘ and the senior cadre around him in Jabhat al-Nusrah understood the dire situation they faced by 2016. Russia launched its intervention on behalf of the regime in late 2015 and the combination of its air campaign with the largely Iranian-led ground forces saw significant success. By mid-2016 this new order of battle severed Aleppo from the A‘zaz border crossing with Turkey and had placed the opposition-controlled half of Aleppo under siege, it falling to the regime at the end of the year.
Compounding the advantage held by the Russian and Iranian-backed Asad regime was the armed opposition’s continued failure to unite its ranks, with cleavages over hometown, ideology, and personal rivalry that had beset it since the very beginning showing no signs of abatement. Meanwhile Jabhat al-Nusrah was classified as a terrorist organization by most the world and the US drone assassination campaign targeting al-Qa‘idah officials and Nusrah higher ups in Idlib was beginning to accelerate. This terrorist designation further worked to obstruct opposition unification as other factions refused to join the almost universally sanctioned Jabhat al-Nusrah.
The first step taken by al-Shar‘ was Nusrah’s separation from al-Qa‘idah and brief rebranding under the name Jabhat Fatah al-Sham in summer 2016. While most observers were skeptical as to the authenticity of the separation its authenticity became apparent from the documentary record and by way of the intense multi-staged fallout within the Syrian jihadi scene. In January 2017 Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham was formed as a merger between what had been Nusrah and four other Islamist factions, headed behind the scenes and later officially by al-Shar‘.
Subsequent steps included:
Establishing hegemony over all other military and political actors inside Idlib, starting with less radical groups close to Turkey, namely Ahrar al-Sham, who’s more internationally palatable reputation was a threat. After vanquishing Ahrar al-Sham HTS turned on the independent jihadi factions. By late 2020 all groups had been brought to heel, either through forcible disbandment or being brought into HTS’s military coordination body for Idlib, the al-Fath al-Mubin operations room.
Acquiescing to the Turkish military intervention into Idlib, beginning in October 2017, that took place in coordination with Russia by way of the Sochi/Astana process. This served to prevent the collapse of the Idlib pocket, particular after early 2020 week of clashes between Turkey and regime forces, following which the front line remained frozen until HTS launched its November 2024 offensive.
Forming the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) in November 2017, staffed with local members of the educated middle classes independent of the international political opposition and tasked with day-to-day governance.2 This removed such duties from the hands of military actors, while keeping HTS’s image a step removed from non-security matters. A consultative council was created in February 2019, elected by government-selected delegates3. Service provision relied heavily on international NGOs still active in the region (many western NGOs pulled out after HTS’s full takeover, due to continued terrorist designation).
Centralizing religious institutions and empowering the traditional, credentialed religious scholars, particularly those belonging to the predominant Shafi‘i school of Islamic jurisprudence, to the detriment of independent or faction-aligned salafi sheikhs that previously dominated the religious sphere. The terms ‘deradicalization’ and ‘relocalization’ used by the authors largely refer to this process in which HTS eschewed salafism in favor of the mainstream of conservative Islam found in Idlib. Relatedly they note that focus shifted from creed to matters of jurisprudence, with (Idlibi) society no longer viewed as an entity to shape but a current to swim amongst.
Facilitating the rise of a new class of HTS-linked businessmen who benefited from the group’s control of the border crossings to the dominate sector and invest in the nascent privatized public sphere developing under the Turkish security umbrella, namely in the form of the shopping mall.
At no point did HTS voice a new doctrine or cohesive ideology differentiating itself from its Jabhat al-Nusrah past. Doing so might call attention to the changes implemented and draw ire from those still rooted in the salafi-jihadi orbit. Meanwhile it began attempting to reach out to international actors, seeking recognition and terrorist organization delisting. This system in its entirety served to further HTS’s goals of survival, consolidation, building its offensive capabilities for an undated reopening of the fronts. As the authors note, “social peace was essential for its war effort.”4
Moving past December 8, 2024 we are able to notice a continuation of much of the same behavior from the new al-Shar‘-led government. All previously existing factions were forced to submit themselves to the Ministry of Defense. While it was claimed at the time that they were disbanded, its quite clear that whole factions were admitted into the new army as brigades or divisions. However, none of these actors have an independent political project (apart from self-preservation) meaning HTS was happy with this approach as the path of least resistance. This explains in part why the SDF integration talks have achieved so little: the SDF has a robust political project of its own and is part of a broader, almost 50 year old political movement.
Key ministries such as Defense, Foreign Affairs, Security, Intelligence, and Justice have all been placed in the hands of core HTS figures: Murhaf Abu Qasrah, As‘ad al-Shaibani, Anas al-Khattab, Hussein al-Salamah, and Mazhar al-Wais, respectively. The others have been divided up and placed in the hands of figures formerly affiliated with the SSG, other opposition organizations, or the former regime’s bureaucracy. The Directorate of Political Affairs was strangely placed under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, keeping it close to the President. Meanwhile the senior religious positions of Minister of Awqaf and Head of the High Fatwah Council have gone to Muhammad Abu al-Khair Shukri and Usama al-Rifa‘i, both belonging to the traditional Damascus ‘ulema and formerly affiliated with the mainstream Turkish-based Syrian Islamic Council.
The role for the public within the interim administration has been miniscule and highly controlled. These include episodes such as the ‘National Dialogue Conference’ and the People’s Assembly ‘elections,’ the latter seemingly a direct copy of the SSG legislative ‘elections.’ Meanwhile political parties are still not formally allowed to operate as laws governing party life must be passed by the People’s Assembly. The People’s Assembly has yet to meet because the third of the body to be appointed by al-Shar‘ has not been announced. As stated at the top we do not know what al-Shar‘ pictures the government looking like in five years (or if there even is a picture).
The new government’s primary success has been in the field of international recognition. Certainly al-Shar‘ and al-Shaibani have demonstrated skill in this domain, though other factors have been vital. Most regional states were happy to see Asad go and eagerly anticipate the possibility of Syria no longer being a failed state. The primary conflicts that defined the region over the last decade, the GCC vs. Iran and the GCC vs. Qatar and Turkey, have both been in a period of détente dating back to before the fall of the regime. Israel’s genocide in Gaza and its regionally unfettered behavior have only reinforced these détentes. Friendly relations with Syria have been pursued by almost all regional states. Additionally there is the Trump factor: by way of his close personal relationships with President Erdogan and Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman Trump was convinced early on to support the new government in Syria. If Kamala Harris was currently in power there’s a good chance that few of Trump’s moves with regards to sanctions and personal meetings would’ve been carried out, as the White House would’ve weighed international benefits against the good odds that friendly ties with al-Shar‘ would expose Harris to immediate and unrepentant domestic attacks from the right wing.
While the field for political contestation remains closed to the Syrian public, the main political force in the country has been the largely bottom-up upswell of “Umayyad nationalism.” While this gets vaguely addressed by members of the new government, as they enter into a nation-building project largely defined by being opposed to the Ba‘th party, the discourse flourishes online and in person and on car rear window decals. The massacres targeting ‘Alawis on the coast in March and Druze in al-Suwayda’ in July were painted by many as evidence that the murderously sectarian jihad of the last decade continues and that it lives on within al-Shar‘ and his government. However the discursive animosity that stoked and celebrated the real life manifestations - carried out by a wide range of actors both within and outside the state security apparatus - does not resemble the fatwas of Ibn Taymiyyah but rather that of, for example, ethnic conflicts in the constituent republics of the collapsing USSR. The issue is not how one worships God but rather who is represented by the state and who is allowed to make demands on it.
The logic of the new populism is that now, Syria is Sunni, and minorities must submit to this reality. Syria’s Christians are scattered, the Isma‘ilis numerically small, neither possessing a unified political project, while both possess useful allies to the new political order: the West and the Agha Khan Foundation. The Twelver Shi‘ah are numerically small and scattered and given their association with now banished Iran they seemingly have no choice but to stay out of the news and look to the state for protection. It is the ‘Alawi, the Druze, and the Kurds (in reverse order), the so-called ‘compact minorities,’ that represent the greatest threat to the state and to an Umayyad Syria, therefore these are the communities at which the new populism is largely directed.
In their conclusion Haenni and Drevon speak to this new populism, referring to it as “post-Salafist radicalism recast in populist terms,” and a “sectarian recasting of radicalism.”5 According to their assessment:
This new wave of radicalism is fueled by the less ideologically driven segments of the new authorities’ support base. It includes parts of the Syrian National Army consumed by passions of revenge and identitarianism. It encompasses armed factions from the North—often former Free Syrian Army units now integrated into the Syrian National Army—rural communities or rival neighborhoods entangled in long-standing wartime tensions with neighbouring Alawite populations, Bedouin tribes across various regions, and young Sunni opposition members seeking retribution for the loss of family members. These groups often mobilise using symbols associated with Jihadi culture, such as al-Qaeda or Umayyad flags, militant hymns, and religious headbands, not out of ideological commitment but as expressions of identity and revenge.6
This is compared to bottom-up initiatives detailed in the book that took place in Idlib in 2023 and 2024, in which segments of the public and the bureaucracy demanded the Salvation Government begin more strictly enforcing public morality. The authorities’ response at the time was a mixture of acceptance, watering down proposed legislation, and bureaucratic obfuscation. Today the stakes relating to the populist groundswell are much higher as they center around issues of central state importance: the potential integration of north east Syria and al-Suwayda’, as well as how the ‘Alawi community previously so intertwined with the former regime is addressed. Haenni and Drevon warn that with regards to such, al-Shar‘’s “ambiguity is no longer a tool of prudence, but a threat to coherence and authority.”7
Apart from how al-Shar‘ will continue to address these populist currents another key question remains: what are the main strategic goals the new government holds? Prior to December 8th the HTS goals were clear enough: survive, stabilize Idlib, create hegemony, attack regime. Does the government possess current long term goals apart from getting US sanctions removed and ending SDF and Druze militia autonomy?
From chapter 11 - I have an Epub version that lacks page numbers.
Notably an HTS official once told the authors that “you can ‘t delegate too much to a political spectrum that’s completely fragmented and incapable of playing the institutional game” (chapter 9).
“Ultimately, it considered elections as a principle for rotating authority but confined them strictly to non-sovereign civil institutions, excluding critical domains such as security, the military apparatus, and economic control” (chapter 12).
chapter 9.
chapter 10.
Epilogue.
Epilogue.