Turan Tugayı: Central Asians in the Syrian National Army
A Furqat al-Hamzah subfaction active on the Afrin front lines
On September 21st a short video circulated on social media appearing to show a group of Central Asian militants deployed to Afrin in support of al-Quwwah al-Mushtarikah’s mobilization against fellow SNA factions al-Jabhah al-Shamiyah and Suqour al-Shamal. The video shows approximately a dozen well armed and equipped men gathered at night around a man seemingly giving them instructions in a Turkic language. The man filming the group introduces them to the camera as “Quwwah Mushtarikah.” A number of different patches are visible on the men, the three most visible being a yellow crescent on a green background, a Göktürk wolf with the word “Turk” written in Old Turkic script - both common Turkish nationalist iconography, and a yellow pattern of three interlocking crescents and stars on a red background. According to the captions published with the video it was filmed near Kafr Jannah, a flashpoint in recent tensions due to its location on the border of the Afrin and A‘zaz regions, areas controlled by al-Quwwah al-Mushtarikah and al-Jabhah al-Shamiyah respectively.
In the past people have accused SNA factions harboring foreign fighters/jihadists within its ranks. This typically stems from either pro-SDF partisans eager to tie the SNA to the Islamic State and/or Nusra/HTS, or since the events of summer and fall 2022 anti-HTS oppositionists targeting Furqat al-Hamzah and Furqat al-Sultan Suleiman Shah for their alliance with HTS against al-Jabhah al-Shamiyah. In May 2021 pro-SDF outlet AfrinPost accused Faylaq al-Sham commander ‘Abdullah Halawah of hosting 200 HTS-linked Uzbek fighters in villages on the southwestern Afrin front lines. Two years later in December 2023 observers speculated that a man seen fighting for al-Quwwah al-Mushtarikah on the same front lines in a low resolution video (on the right at 2:17) was Central Asian due to his distinctive haircut and facial hair and the editor inexplicably pixelating shots focused on him. This video represented stronger evidence for such accusations than had existed prior, however the location it was filmed and the identities of the individuals present were not confirmed.
Since then Twitter user Vitis V made the discovery that these men belong to a group named “Turan Tugayı” or “Liva Turan” - Turan being a historical name for part of modern day Central Asia and ‘tugayı’ and ‘liva’ (from the Arabic word liwa’/لواء) meaning brigade in Turkish. Analysis of the visual media published by the group on Telegram, YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram show it to be a small component faction within the ranks of Furqat al-Hamzah and, in turn, al-Quwwah al-Mushtarikah. Its logo is the same interlocking crescent emblem seen in the September 21st video and appears to be lifted from Enver Pasha’s Special Organization, key perpetrators of the Armenian and Assyrian genocides. Above and below the crescents the logo reads “Hamzah Division - Turan Brigade.”
Photos show group members meeting with Furqat al-Hamzah commander Sayf Polat and being present at known Furqat al-Hamzah bases including its main headquarters (and mercenary departure point) at the Hawar Kilis military crossing.
While not a particularly scientific statement and not forensically conclusive a lot (but not all) of the members seen in photos have Central Asian rather than Levantine physical features. The limited information the group has published to social media pointing to diversity within its ethnic makeup: its Facebook handle is “TuranTugayiUzbek” while it has published statements in (judging from Google Translate’s auto-detect feature) Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Tajik, alongside Arabic and Turkish.
This mixed membership would make it similar to Central Asian jihadist factions in Idlib such as Katibat al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad and Katibat al-Imam al-Bukhari as well as the various foreign jihadi private military companies that have developed in Idlib over the last five years or so.
The Telegram channel actually identifies several of the fighters by name including an “Umar Fidoiy,” the man seen speaking to the other fighters in the September 21st video, and a “Pilot,” the man seen standing next to him.
Turan Tugayı appears to be a relatively recent creation. The first videos on its YouTube channel were posting in April 2024, while an Uzbek man who appears to work with them in some sort of media capacity first posted about their presence in northern Aleppo in November 2023. The same man appears to have been solely Idlib-based until posting photos from the Church of Julianos in the Afrini front line town of Barad in August 2023. This group could have arrived in the area to fight for Furqat al-Hamzah following HTS’s intervention into Afrin in October 2022 in support of the group. The alternative would be that the earlier reports of Uzbeks affiliated with ‘Abdullah Halawah were correct (as some allege now) and the group stayed with Furqat al-Hamzah after Halawah fled Syria over a drug scandal.
Claimed attacks and geolocation shows Turan Tugayı to be deployed along the Afrin/al-Shahba’ front where it reportedly acts as inghimasi shock troops, raiding front line SDF/HRE positions. Their presence likely explains a newfound aggressiveness I’ve noticed from al-Quwwah al-Mushtarikah along this front line since the end of last year. Whereas the SNA typically maintains a defensive and reactive posture towards HRE’s offensive tactics, relying on static heavy weaponry to respond, in recent months al-Quwwah al-Mushtarikah has begun claiming its own raids in addition to utilizing weaponized drones. In addition to its combat role the group might also being training Furqat al-Hamzah/al-Quwwah al-Mushtarikah fighters a la Central Asian-led jihadi PMCs in Idlib.
The confirmed existence of a Central Asian brigade within Furqat al-Hamzah raises more questions than answers. For one, the pan-Turkist symbolism visible in the group’s social media is unique for Central Asians in Syria, who are typically austere Salafi-Jihadists affiliated with al-Qa‘idah (or splinter movements). The limited glimpse we have here looks more akin to some of the Turkmen groups active over the years in northern Latakia who maintained ties with ultranationalists in Turkey, attracting Turkish volunteers, and adopting the MHP’s ideology of nationalist-Islamist synthesis.