This week in Northern Syria (XII)
This week in Northern Syria (XII)
A rundown of key events from Turkish/SNA & SDF-controlled territories
The new school year began a little over a week ago in AANES-controlled areas, bringing with it protests highlighting long-running grievances regarding the administration’s curriculum. Rojava Information Center shared statistics regarding the number of teachers, students, schools, which they further broke down by the various administrative divisions: Tabqah, al-Raqqah, Manbij, Deir ez-Zour, Jazeera, Euphrates, al-Shahba’.
Overall that’s a 20:1 student to teacher ratio [class sizes us graduates of the NYC public school system could only dream of], however there is great regional disparity within these figures:
Another interesting statistic provided by RIC is that nationwide AANES areas have “the highest rate of functioning schools, though school attendance is by the lowest in Syria.” A possible explanation provided by RIC is “the high number of rural communities & poverty,” which is certainly a factor. Another is likely widespread dissatisfaction with the AANES curriculum, exemplified by protests this week in various areas across the region including both the ‘Jazeera’ (or al-Hasakah governorate) and Deir ez-Zour.
The protests in these two regions stem from distinctive local grievances. In northern and central al-Hasakah governorate/Jazeera canton there is significant dissatisfaction with AANES schooling because it is not recognized anywhere outside the Administration’s jurisdiction, greatly limiting students’ ability to pursue higher education elsewhere in Syria or abroad. Furthermore, the AANES has banned private institutions and instruction that teach the Syrian regime curriculum, leading locals to call a sit-in protest at the al-Qamishli UN headquarters. Additionally, there is ideological contestation present across al-Hasakah as the AANES’s curriculum is based in ‘Apoci’ thought, drawing objections from Kurdish constituents of parties opposed to the PYD, as well as Arab and Syriac populations largely in support of Damascus.
Protests occurring in southern al-Hasakah governorate and Deir ez-Zour this week regarding school have focused on more material and more ideological complaints. According to SyriaTV:
Teachers in al-Shaddadi, Markada and al-Dashisha [al-Hasakah governorate] announced the general strike until their salaries were increased by the Education Commission in the AANES. Teachers in [AANES] educational complexes said “schools will not be opened in general, in the city and its villages, until a decision is issued to increase salaries by 100%.” [According to SyriaTV, AANES teachers’ monthly salaries are 260,000 Syrian pounds, or 56 USD.]
While this is the case across AANES-controlled territory due to its internationally-isolated position, Deir ez-Zour and adjacent regions in particular suffer from poor service provision (visible in the disparate student:teacher ratios highlighted above), a clear factor in this unrest.
Meanwhile, other protests and statements put out by local tribal officials, such as Sheikh Hajim al-Bashir of the Baggarah tribe, rejected “the curriculum of the Autonomous Administration because it is not compatible with [their] religion, [their] principles, and [their] beliefs.”
Textbook references to historical figures such as Buddha, Spinoza, and Sartre, as well as ideological figurehead of the AANES Abdullah Öcalan, also drew the ire of local Telegram channels.
These disputes regarding education within AANES-controlled territory have been ongoing for years and show no sign of abating. Even if the administration was to put out a less or non-Apoci curriculum more palatable to non-PYD constituents (though perhaps still not acceptable to more conservative populations under their control), this would not solve the issues regarding recognition of educational system. For very understandable reasons - hoping their kids could pursue higher levels of education elsewhere - parents will continue to seek out regime-affiliated schooling.
Events
09/20/22: Muhammed al-Sa’our, a displaced veterinarian originally from Eastern Ghouta, was murdered on a farm outside al-Bab. The perpetrator, a Marwan Bahjat ‘Abd al-Haqq also from Ghouta, had lured the victim to the property by offering to pay a sum of money he owed but instead shot and killed al-Sa’our. ‘Abd al-Haqq confessed to the murder when questioned by members of the SNA Third Corps and was transferred to the civil police. However, in a manner reminiscent of an incident occurring in Ras al-’Ain last week, gunmen (also from Eastern Ghouta) stopped the vehicle ‘Abd al-Haqq was being transported in two days later and executed him on the spot.
09/20/22: Omar Salkho, a commander in SNA faction Liwa’ al-Shamal, was arrested by Turkish authorities at his house in Gaziantep, allegedly on charges of working for the Islamic State. Salkho has long been a prominent figure within the armed opposition, fighting in the battles for Aleppo city has a commander in factions Liwa’ Halab al-Madinah, Jaysh al-Mujahideen, and Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki. Salkho was allegedly present (it looks like him and make sense given his role in the group at the time, but I can’t remember if it was actually confirmed) when Zenki fighters beheaded a child soldier affiliated with a Palestinian pro-regime militia captured in the Handarat refugee camp.
09/22/22: The SDF and Coalition reported thwarting several IS VBIED attack in the vicinity of al-Hawl, seemingly conducted in response to the anti-IS security sweep conducted in the camp over the past month.
09/22/22: SNA faction Hay’at Tha’iroun lil-Tahrir published photos of its commander Fahim al-‘Issa visiting the recently opened al-Ra’i industrial city. Highlighting the heavily intertwined connections between military and economic power the photos show Fahim visiting an asphalt plant owned by his brother, Hussein, a member of the al-Ra’i Local Council’s Chamber of Industry and Commerce.
09/23/22: The YPG published a video showing a series of attacks on Turkish targets, some located across the border from Syria. According to YPG media, these attacks took place on September 16, 18, 20 and 21 in response to a Turkish drone strike that killed two veteran PKK operatives on September 16th. The first video, showing an ATGM strike on a Turkish military vehicle across the border, is likely the attack that killed a Turkish soldier on September 18th.
09/24/22: Protests took place in the city of al-Shaddadi, southern al-Hasakah governorate, against death penalty sentences handed down to individuals accused of espionage on behalf of the Turkish state. Reports of such charges have circulated around social media over the past several weeks ever since the SDF announced a security campaign attempting to clamp down on local informants involved in Turkey’s drone assassination campaign.
Due to the lack of documentation regarding such sentences I have so far avoid reporting on such. The AANES has yet to publicize anything on such cases.
09/24/22: ‘Defence Blog’ reported the Turkish Bayraktar Akinci ‘heavy attack drone’ was photographed flying over Syria for the first time. This armed UAV possesses a significantly heavy payload than the Bayraktar TB-2.
09/24/22: A commander in SNA faction Faylaq al-Sham was killed when his vehicle was struck by an ATGM reportedly fired by regime forces near the village of Kabashin, on the Afrin/al-Shahba' front.
