This week in Northern Syria (VI)
This week in Northern Syria (VI)
A rundown of key events from Turkish/SNA & SDF-controlled territories
“We need to bring the opposition and regime together for reconciliation somehow, there will be no permanent peace otherwise.”
This statement made to reporters on August 11th by Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu set off a wave of protests across northern Syria, representing an unprecedented display of popular anger towards Turkish policy in opposition-controlled territory. Speaking at the same event, Çavuşoğlu also mentioned briefly having met with Syrian FM Faisal al-Miqdad at last year’s Non-Aligned Movement meeting in Belgrade. These are the latest in a series of recent events pointing towards a gradual rapprochement between Syria and Turkey, a prospect the opposition and its civilian constituents find highly worrisome given Turkey’s role as their last international sponsor.
Normalization would in many ways be a logical outcome of the revision of Turkey’s Syria policy that began in 2016. Sparked by an array of domestic and international developments, this saw Turkey replace its ambitious push for regime change in Damascus with a focus on eradicating the AANES/SDF project and preventing a further influx of refugees across the border. This has led to both Turkish direct intervention (against the Islamic State initially but primarily against the SDF) and a general freezing of the conflict between the regime and the opposition. There are only two ways for Turkey to cement this status quo in a somewhat permanent manner: an indefinite occupation of northern Syria, or facilitating some sort of reconciliation between the regime and the opposition that would also act to prevent Kurdish autonomy and strip the PYD of any political power. Outside of the internal logic of Turkish foreign policy, Erdogan is facing increased pressure in favor of rapprochement from both Putin as well as from Turkey’s political opposition. That being said, Syria-Turkey normalization is far from guaranteed and is not assisted by the Asad regime’s noted tendency towards obstinacy.
Almost immediately Çavuşoğlu’s statements sparked protests across Turkish/SNA and HTS-controlled areas. The general sentiment behind these spontaneous demonstrations has been aptly encapsulated in the hashtag لن_نصالح#, “We will not reconcile.” Essentially every actor active in Turkish-controlled Syria from SNA commanders to civil society organizations has condemned Çavuşoğlu’s remarks, demonstrating a broad consensus against any Turkish attempts to reconcile the opposition with Damascus and as well as Turkish-Syrian normalization. However, the shape these reactions have taken varies widely. On one end of the spectrum protestors tore down Turkish flags (found everywhere in the public landscape), some even burning them. On the other end, where most SNA commanders and civil society orgs closely linked to Turkey exist, condemnation of Çavuşoğlu’s remarks was tempered with discourse highlighting Turkey’s unrivaled support of the Syrian opposition and emphasizing “Syrian-Turkish brotherhood.” With that aspect in mind and given the lack of local polling, I would caution one from viewing the more hardline anti-Turkey actions and rhetoric as necessarily indicative of popular sentiment. What these events do demonstrate is that there are emerging contradictions between Turkey’s Syria policy and its local constituents.
Above: Turkish Minister of the Interior Süleyman Soylu announcing the arrest of a man accused of attempting to burn the Turkish flag
Above: Harakat al-Tahrir wa’l-Bina’ commander Hussein al-Hamadi saying that the Syrian people bear respect for the flag which hundreds of ‘Turkish martyrs’ killed in Syria died for, and those that don’t are distorting and diverting the Syrian revolution.
Events
08/09/22: Four members of Hêzên Xweparastinê (HXP), the AANES’s conscripted ‘Self-Defense Forces’, were killed by a Turkish drone strike on the northern outskirts of al-Qamishli. According to the SDF the four had been guarding the nearby Jiyan Covid-19 Center (located here), 250m down the street.
#عاجل قصفت طائرة مسيّرة تابعة لجيش الاحتلال التركي منطقة خلف مشفى جيان – كوفيد 19 شمال مدينة قامشلو بالقرب من الحزام الشمالي للمدينة وسط أنباء عن وقوع إصابات في صفوف المواطنين، وفق المعطيات الأولية. 09 آب
Location of the strike in relation to the Syrian-Turkish border: 37.073370, 41.245005 
08/10/22: A Turkish drone strike in the al-Qamishli countryside reportedly killed two members of the SDF as well as a taxi driver named Abid Yusuf.
In light of unprecedented Turkish escalation against #NE_Syria, a Turkish drone attack killed three people in #Syria’s #Qamishli. #Turkey https://t.co/cuMsqGePNi
NORTH PRESS AGENCY - ENGLISH @NPA_English
08/11/22: HRE published three new videos highlighting attacks on Turkish positions in the Afrin and Euphrates Shield areas reportedly occurring the previous week. Both attacks were reported on at the time by local media with reports of Turkish soldiers being injured and possibly killed, however the Turkish MoD did not reported any soldiers KIA from the area at the time.
Li dijî êrîşên artêşa Tirk a dagirker ku her roj li hember heremê me li dar dixe, di rojên 5, 6 û 7ê Tebaxê de, li herêmên Bab, Şera û Ezazê ji aliyê hêzên me ve çalakiyên bersivdayînê hatin lidar xistin. Di vê çarçoveyê de; Berfirehî li ser linge... t.me/HRE_official
The Turkish base in Anab: 36.516949, 36.963774 (03/16/22, Planet Labs Inc.) Di encama van çalakiyên 3 rojan de bi giştî 1 ji wan fermandar 6 leşkerên artêşa Tirk a dagirker hatin kuştin, 11 leşker jî birîndar bûn. Hêzên Rizgariya Efrînê 11 Tebax 2022 t.me/HRE_official
The Turkish base outside Kiljibrin: 36.526431, 37.129070 08/11/22: The SDF Press Center published a video of an ATGM attack on a Kirpi APC near a borderpost in the Turkish province of Mardin. While the SDF claimed to have killed 23 Turkish soldiers in this attack and two others, this has not been corroborated by Turkey’s MoD or local media. However, the MoD did claim to kill six SDF members in response to the attack.
37.015939, 40.400414?
08/11/22: Turkish Minister of the Interior Süleyman Soylu announced the Hatay Intelligence Branch Directorate, the Syrian Task Force (Turkish Jandarma/Police Special Forces) and Syrian counterparts arrested a man named Hassan Najjar in the A‘zaz/Mare‘ region with a 1.8kg C-4 suicide vest. According to Soylu, Najjar is a member of the ‘PKK/KCK.’
08/13/22: A forest fire broke outside the village of Satiya/Satyan, ten kilometers west of Afrin city. According to Syrian Civil Defence it took firefighters 12 hours to put out the fire. This area is one of many parts of Afrin that’s suffered serious deforestation since Turkey’s 2018 Operation Olive Branch, driven largely by demand for firewood and charcoal due to fuel shortages and profiteering on the part of SNA factions.
08/14/22: HRE published two new videos showing attacks that occurred on the 11th outside the town of Mare‘, in which a vehicle was destroyed with an ATGM, and on the 12th, targeting a Turkish base west of al-Bab. The Turkish military did not report on any potential casualties from these attacks.
Li hember êrîşên artêşa Tirk a dagirker, di çarçoveya parastina rewa de li heremên Bab û Marê çalakiyên bersivdayinê hatin lidar xistin. Di encama van çalakiyên 2 rojan de bi giştî 3 leşker û 3 çete hatin kuştin, 5 leşker û 2 çete jî birîndar bûn. t.me/HRE_official
#عاجل مليشيات قسد الإرهابية تستهدف بصاروخ موجه سيارة على أطراف مدينة مارع شمال حلب. #مراسل_الشرقية_الرسمي ✅
Li hember êrîşên artêşa Tirk a dagirker, di çarçoveya parastina rewa de li heremên Bab û Marê çalakiyên bersivdayinê hatin lidar xistin. Di encama van çalakiyên 2 rojan de bi giştî 3 leşker û 3 çete hatin kuştin, 5 leşker û 2 çete jî birîndar bûn. t.me/HRE_official
Turkish frontline base located 7km SW of al-Bab, 36.333716, 37.455758 08/15/22: The US/Coalition ‘Green Village’ base in Deir ez-Zour was attacked by rockets launched by unknown assailants. Given the location the attackers were most likely affiliated with either the Islamic State or Iranian-backed militias.
The Green Village US/Coalition base, 35.051537, 40.557148
Other
Data collected by Airwars seemingly showing a massive decrease in US airstrikes, actions, and related civilian casualties from Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Somalia under the Biden administration.
airstrikes are still virtually at a standstill compared to Biden's two predecessors airwars.org/conflict-data/
It’s worth pointing out that the decrease of US/Coalition airstrikes in Syria and Iraq actually began under Trump and coincides with the territorial defeat of the Islamic State in early 2019.
(source) Rohani video detailing Turkish drone strikes since 2020
A series of reports published this week by various outlets detailing low water levels and pollution in some of northern Syria’s primary rivers (Balikh, Jaqjaq and the Euphrates, respectively)