This week in Northern Syria
#25: January 10th - 16th
Events
01/10/23: Rida al-’Awad, the spokesman of the al-Bakir clan, survived a drive-by assassination attempt claimed by the Islamic State in the Deir ez-Zour village of al-’Izbah. Al-’Awad was previously the head of the AANES-affiliated al-’Izbah local council and survived an earlier attempt on his life in July 2021. The al-Bakir clan is part of the al-’Akidat tribe and is the same clan Deir ez-Zour Military Council commander Ahmad al-Khabil (‘Abu Khawlah’)belongs to.
01/10/23: The Tell Abyad Local Council published a statement rejecting the rise in electricity prices by AK Energy, labelling the company’s decision “unilateral” and a violation of the agreement between the two. The Local Council threatened legal action if the price hike was not reversed.
01/10/23: The AANES facilitated the return of a number of Kobanî natives who had been stuck in Algeria after traveling there in an attempt to smuggle themselves into Spain. These individuals were part of a larger group - some of whom were deported by Algerian officials into the deserts of northern Niger, while others tragically drowned on October 5th, when a smugglers’ boat sunk in the Mediterranean.
01/11/23: A Turkish drone strike targeted a car traveling on the M4 highway between al-Qamishli and al-Hasakah city. Still no verified information as to casualties incurred.
01/11/23: Barbados repatriated a woman and two children from al-Hawl camp, making it the second country to carry out the repatriation of Islamic State family members in 2023. The only thing I could find online about Barbadian/Bajan Islamic State members is this interview Jake Hanrahan conducted at al-Hawl with (a very unrepentant) Abbey Greene. According to sources of Hanrahan’s Greene was the only Barbadian “ISIS bride” at the camp, meaning she was the adult repatriated on Wednesday. Caribbean Islamic State recruits primarily came from Trinidad and Tobago, a country with much bigger Muslim population than Barbados (~70,000 vs. 4,000) and a history of Islamist militancy. [see these articles from Lawfare and The Atlantic for more on that subject]
01/12/23: A member of the Asayish was killed in an attack claimed by the Islamic State in the western Deir ez-Zour village of al-Hisan.
01/12/23: A Brigadier General of the SAA’s Republican Guard (commander of the 135th Brigade) and three other officers were killed in Turkish/SNA artillery bombardment targeting the village of Mayasah, located on the Afrin/al-Shahba’ front lines. According to Al-Modon, the artillery barrage was fired from the Turkish Military’s “Research Base,” located east of A‘zaz.
01/12/23: The SIG’s Ministry of Defense opened the al-’Awn al-Dadat crossing south of Jarabulus with SDF-controlled Manbij to civilian movement in an effort to combat human trafficking between the two statelets.
01/13/2: SNC president Salem al-Meslet made an appearance at a demonstration being held in central A’zaz against Turkish-Syrian reconciliation and recent statements supporting such efforts made by SIG president Abdulrahman Mustafa [see last week’s newsletter]. Al-Meslet’s presence was brief as he was quickly attacked and expelled by protestors serenading his entourage with cries of “shabiha,” in reference to infamous pro-regime thugs from the early days of the uprising. A statement later published by al-Meslet and the SNC didn’t blame the demonstrators but rather parties with “special agendas.” The protest later ended up at the SNC headquarters in A’zaz where demonstrators demanded Etilaf and SIG officials resign.
01/13/23: Artillery fired from the SDF/regime-controlled al-Shahba’ region struck a Turkish based near the village of Hazwan west of al-Bab, killing a Turkish soldier and reportedly wounding several others.
01/13/23: A twenty year old man was reportedly shot dead by Turkish border guards while trying to crossing into Turkey outside the town of al-Ra’i. Such incidents are relatively common - just last week Turkish border guards reportedly shot and killed a young man attempting to cross near the western Idlib town of ‘Azmarin. According to Ehtemlat News Telegram channel 24 similar killings occurred over the course of 2022, while VDCNSY alleged the number was 46 though this figure also includes those shot by Turkish border guards near the border as well.
01/14/23: Iraq announced the decision to repatriate 150 families (according to RIC 584 individuals) from al-Hawl camp, specifying that these were women and children deemed to have no relationship to the Islamic State. Iraqi citizens make up an estimated 50% of the entire al-Hawl population.
(source) 01/16/22: The Syrian Civil Defense reported that cholera deaths in northwestern Syria (Idlib and Turkish/SNA-controlled Aleppo) had risen to twenty, with 555 individuals testing positive. The countrywide cholera outbreak was first reported in September of last year.
01/16/22: In an interview with Al-Monitor SDF Commander Mazloum ‘Abdi stated “We take Turkey’s threats seriously. We expect an attack in February. The town of Kobani is a likely target because of its symbolic meaning for Kurds world over.” This was in response to new threats from Turkish officials regarding a potential operation made within the context of the complicated negotiations regarding Turkish-Syrian reconciliation.
Other
The SIG published an infographic of attacks on Idlib and Turkish/SNA-controlled northern Syria over the course of 2022. According to their unreleased dataset the regime was responsible for 1211 ‘targeting operations,’ 5 ‘massacres,’ 2 attacks on ‘protected notables and crews’ (this might mean first responders, maybe someone with better Arabic can correct me), and 5 attacks with internationally banned weapons, while the SDF was responsible for 103 ‘targeting operations,’ 3 ‘massacres,’ and 2 attacks on ‘protected notables and crews.’ I would be curious to see how responsibility is assessed though it’s unlikely the data or methodology will be released. A similar report regarding attacks by Turkey/SNA and IS on the AANES was published by the SDF in December.