This week in Northern Syria
#27: January 24th - 30th
On the evening of January 25 a leader of Ahrar al-Sham’s eastern sector was killed in the northern al-Bab countryside under mysterious circumstances. Saddam al-Mousa, also known Abu ‘Uday al-Bab, was walking on the road outside his house (see here for location) with a flock of sheep around sunset (at 5:10 according to Enab Baladi) when he was struck and mortally wounded by an explosion.

Initial reports and subsequently published CCTV footage indicate this was the result of a targeted drone attack. It has still not been confirmed whether the drone belonged Turkey, Russia, or the Coalition, though the evidence increasingly points to Turkey being the party responsible. If this is the case this would represent the first time an SNA was assassinated in a Turkish drone strike.


The moment of the attack was captured by a nearby CCTV camera. This footage appears to show al-Mousa looking upwards and then ducking immediately before the explosion, giving credence to reports of a drone strike.

Photos published several days after the attack show the remnants of a Turkish MAM-L laser-guided munition, frequently used by TB-2 drones, allegedly retrieved from the scene. While the images appear to be new, there is no evidence tying these to the site of the attack.






Saddam al-Mousa was born in the nearby village of al-Boughaz (now under SDF control) and joined the armed opposition in the early days of the war. According to a brief biography published by Ahrar al-Sham he joined the group early on, participating in battles in Latakia and Idlib before returning to northern Aleppo in 2016 to take part in Turkey’s Operation Euphrates Shield. Al-Mousa became the commander of Brigade 321, one of the several brigades making up Ahrar al-Sham’s ‘Eastern Sector’: the name of the group’s contingent within the SNA, affiliated with the SNA Third Legion under name Division 32 until mid-2022. Al-Mousa’s group is now commonly know as Liwa’ Ahrar ‘Awlan, in reference to ‘Awlan village north of al-Bab city controlled by Ahrar al-Sham.
If Turkey was responsible for this assassination its motivation was likely related to ongoing negotiations with Ahrar al-Sham over the fate of al-Hamran crossing, the key transit point at which AANES-produced oil enters opposition territory. Ahrar al-Sham seized al-Hamran in October 2022 during the clashes which pitted it, HTS, and several SNA factions against the SNA Third Legion. Turkey has been demanding al-Hamran be turned over to the Syrian Interim Government, while Ahrar al-Sham has so far refused while attempting revenue concessions on behalf of HTS. According to Al-Modon and SyriaTV, Saddam Mousa and Ahrar ‘Awlan represent the local pro-HTS wing of Ahrar al-Sham and are reportedly close to prominent (al-Qa’idah/)HTS personality Abu Maria al-Qahtani.
Events
01/24/23: France repatriated fifteen women and thirty two children from Roj camp. According to RIC “This brings the total number of French citizens repatriated up to 191 (47 women and 144 children).”
01/25/23: The Islamic State claimed an attack on a checkpoint in the Deir ez-Zour village of al-Hawayij that reportedly killed two SDF fighters. The casualties were confirmed by the SDF’s Hajin Military Council.
01/25/23: The SDF announced a new anti-Islamic State security operation called the “Campaign of revenge for the martyrs of al-Raqqah,” referring to the December IS attack in al-Raqqah city that killed four members of the Asayish and two SDF fighters. The campaign began with raids across the al-Raqqah governorate including in the al-Raqqah, al-Tabqah, al-Karamah, and Sarrin subdistricts. The following day the SDF announced the arrest of an individual they alleged to be the IS wali of al-Raqqah province.
01/26/23: Shop owners in the city of Manbij launched a general strike in protest of the an ongoing SDF conscription campaign in the area. According to media reports, the SDF had detained dozens of men at checkpoints set up in the area to enroll them in military service. Conscription remains one of the most controversial and contested SDF policies throughout the regions it controls.
01/26/23: Interesting story regarding rebel reconciliation and displacement: A commander in SNA Faylaq al-Rahman set up a mourning tent in Ma’batli, Afrin, for his nephew who died in Latakia fighting in the ranks of the Syrian army. Faylaq al-Rahman is originally from the Damascus suburb of Eastern Ghouta, where after significant regime advances in spring 2018 opposition fighters were given the option of either reconciling and joining the SAA or being shipped north to Idlib. It appears that the nephew chose the former and his uncle chose the latter. Furqat al-Sultan Suleiman Shah reportedly removed the mourning tent once it attention in the media.
01/28/23: Another video circulated on local Afrin and Kurdish media showing further deforestation in the region. This video was filmed in the Cindires subdistrict in the hills north of Kafr Safra. [location]
01/29/23: Two SDF fighters were killed along the front lines with Turkish/SNA-controlled northeastern Syria, one in shelling targeting al-Tirwaziyah, al-Raqqah, and the other due to a gunshot sustained in al-Aghaybish, al-Hasakah.
01/29/23: A representative of the French Foreign Ministry visited leaders of SDF-allied Shammar tribe including the successor to recently deceased tribal leader Sheikh Humaydi Daham al-Jarba Sheikh Man’ al-Hamidi al-Daham and Sheikh Humaydi’s son Bandar al-Humaydi, commander of Quwwat al-Sanadid.
01/30/23: SNA Harakat al-Tahrir wa’l-Bina’ (a coalition of factions from eastern Syria including Ahrar al-Sharqiyah) reportedly ambushed regime forces on the Tadif front south of al-Bab, killing a captain in the SAA’s 4th Division.
Other
An interview from the Turkey recap substack with analyst Kerim Has on Turkey-Russia relations.
Photograph from the ‘90s of the ancient ‘Ain Diwar bridge, located in the very northeastern corner of Syria on the Tigris river ~1.5km southwest of the Turkish city of Cizre.