The situation around Manbij and some comments on the US-SDF relationship
The SNA begins to pressure the Manbij pocket
Since my update on the situation yesterday developments across Syria have only accelerated, with the fate of Damascus and Bashar al-Asad’s government even more in question. While the HTS-led battle for the city of Homs reportedly only started early in the evening, the situation around the capital has changed dramatically. Regime forces have withdrawn from Syria’s south, with the reconciled rebels of Dara‘a and largely neutral Druze militias of al-Suwayda’ appearing to have filled the vacuum, with some reportedly advancing north on Damascus. Posters and statues of Bashar and Hafiz al-Asad have been torn down by residents of various Damascene neighborhoods and suburbs, including Darayya, a stronghold of the opposition from the early days of the civilian uprising and subsequent war, and the Druze and Christian-populated city of Jaramana. The SDF continues to consolidate control over the western bank of the Euphrates in Deir ez-Zour and al-Raqqah, while the regime’s “security square” pockets in the center of al-Hasakah and al-Qamishli are in the process of being handed over to the SDF.
With regards to northern Syria the question remains whether the SNA and its Turkish backers will be able to use this opportunity to capture the Manbij region from the SDF. Clashes between the SNA and SDF have occurred since November 30th, when both responded to the evaporation of the regime’s military in the areas north and east of Aleppo. That day, a number of SNA factions announced the “Dawn of Freedom” (Fajr al-Hurriyah) operation, which later managed to capture Tell Rifa‘at, along with a stretch of territory running from al-Bab to Deir Hafir to the Euphrates river near the town of al-Khafsah. The SDF ended up with some towns and villages south of the Manbij pocket - outside the defensive line of berms and tunnels built over the years - in addition to separate stretch of territory around the town of Maskanah, seized by the SDF from the direction al-Tabqah following regime withdrawal. On December 3rd the Operation ‘Dawn of Freedom’ social media accounts announced that SNA fighters were in control of the al-Babari water station, meaning the front line between the two actors was likely located somewhere nearby to the south.
The SNA did not claim the capture of more locations until December 6th, when ‘Dawn of Freedom’ accounts announced control over al-Tahyah, al-‘Aziziyah, al-Na‘im, al-Kiban, and al-Sheikh Abyad, settlements located just south of the SDF’s Manbij pocket defensive lines. It’s unclear whether they faced resistance but it’s doubtful the SDF would expend significant resources on villages located just outside well established fortifications. Close observers might recognize al-Tahyah as the former official crossing between regime and SDF territory, also known by the name of adjacent SDF-controlled village Abu Kahf.
Later that day, ‘Dawn of Freedom’ accounts published a statement that has been widely reported as a declaration of The Manbij offensive. In it they accused the SDF of launching “attacks on several villages in the Aleppo countryside, [taking] control of some of them… [and trying] to expand towards [SNA] positions, which threatens to disrupt the liberation process,” forcing the SNA “to defend [its] positions and protect [its] people from these attacks.” It’s unclear what this is in reference to exactly as the situation has remained fluid and opaque to outside observers. Two nights earlier the SDF published a statement denying that it had attempted to advance “toward areas east of Aleppo,” in reference to unconfirmed reports that clashes occurred in the vicinity of Kuweires airbase to the west, previously captured by the SNA.
Since then it does appear that SNA forces involved in this theater have concentrated their efforts on the pre-December Manbij pocket, with combined artillery bombardment, loitering munitions attacks, and attempts at advancing. The latter is what does signal a shift, for Manbij has faced SNA and likely Turkish bombardment throughout the week, as it has regularly throughout much of the last several years. Today between 5-6pm the SNA claimed to capture two towns west of Manbij on the M4: Jablat al-Hamrah and Jubb Makhzoum, the former on the 2017 frontlines and the latter sitting behind it. This has not been independently confirmed. While earlier in the day the SDF’s Manbij Military Council published a statement denying the loss of territory to the concerted SNA push and a video reportedly showing a destroyed SNA vehicle near Jablat al-Hamrah, its two posts since have highlighted civilian casualties in these two towns and the surrounding areas. Additionally the SNA published combat footage purportedly from an attack on the town of Tell Usoud, on the edge of SDF territory south of Manbij. To the south the SDF’s al-Tabqah Military Council reported facing a three pronged SNA attack on the town of Maskanah around 5pm.
So far it remains to be seen how much the SNA will dedicate to this offensive, as significant contingents of SNA fighters are are taking part in the HTS-led offensive against the regime to the south. Additionally it is unclear whether all thirty or so SNA factions have sent men to the Manbij and Maskanah fronts as part of the ‘Dawn of Freedom’ operation, or whether only several factions are taking part. The initial media related to the launching of the operation imply that it’s being spearheaded by Furqat al-Sultan Murad, al-Quwwah al-Mushtarikah (Furqat al-Hamzah and Furqat al-Sultan Suleiman Shah), and Harakat al-Tahrir wa’l Bina’, while Jaysh al-Islam is also involved. Another question mark is how involved Turkey will get in this: currently it is surely offering artillery support from its various bases in the Euphrates Shield region, but seems unlikely to take part in ground operations in the short term.
Currently there’s a lot of commentary out there about whether the US will let Turkey take Manbij, etc. from its “SDF allies.” This misses the fact that the US relationship (not “alliance”) with the SDF is geographically segmented and always has been. During the initial years of the US-YPG partnership, the US maintained no relations with the YPG stationed in Afrin and Aleppo city and assumed no responsibility for protecting them. In 2016, these forces in the west developed a relationship with Russia who later deployed token forces to Afrin in an attempt to deter Turkey from invading the region.
The US’s partnership was always with the YPG and later SDF operating east of the Euphrates, though in 2016 these forces crossed the river and captured Manbij and the surrounding countryside from the Islamic State. The US maintained bases there until Trump’s half-aborted withdrawal and Turkey’s ensuing Operation Peace Spring in October 2019. This saw the US abandon all its military bases in the Manbij, Kobani, and al-Raqqah regions. Since then the US has only operated bases in al-Hasakah and Deir ez-Zour governates - a region it internally calls the “Eastern Syria Security Area” - while US forces sporadically send patrol to al-Raqqah city. These are the only areas where the US is willing and able to provide physical deterrence.
These bases (with their official and/or unofficial names) currently in operation include:
Rumeilan Landing Zone (RLZ), aka Kharab al-Jir, Abu Hajar airport
Dêrik, aka al-Malikiyah, Girê Kera, Khirbat 'Adnan
Istirahat al-Wazir, aka Western Dam, Life Stone, H2, Shamoukah
Ghuweiran, aka Hasakah city
Qasrak, aka Jebel Qulayb, Jebel Ghoul
Mission Support Site Euphrates, aka MSS Conoco
Mission Support Site Green Village, aka Omar oil field
Almost immediately after the US ‘withdrawal,’ Russia (and the regime) deployed forces to these areas of eastern Syria that the US vacated. Since then the SDF has relied on both powers to deter Turkey from launching additional ground incursions. So far this worked, with Turkey instead using drone strikes to decapitate the SDF and cripple its economy through targeting energy infrastructure.
The combination of the regime implosion, uncertain future of Russian presence in eastern Syria, and transition from Biden to Trump throws the post-2019 status quo into serious question. However what remains constant is that US troops are not in Manbij, are not anywhere near Manbij, and will not be deployed to Manbij. A Turkish move on the region will draw the diplomatic protestations from the lame duck Biden administration but little else. That said, the unpredictability of the ongoing events in Syria and the fickleness of Trump might see Turkey avoid immediately stirring the pot.
Will SDF open a new front against TUR … to protect Rojava
What about IS , they will benefit from all what’s happening ?
Looks like it might be falling. Terrible and sad.