Note to followers on the current situation
An announcement, some questions, and an aborted article on the HTS-led offensive, the regime's military collapse, and future ramifications.
This morning I started writing a peice on the dramatic developments that have occurred since the start of the HTS-led offensive in western Aleppo on November 27th. However given that events continue to occur at a whirlwind speed it is near impossible to put out something now that will not be out of date tomorrow. For example as I start write this right now - a little before 5pm Damascus time - the SDF’s al-Shahba’ pocket is seemingly in the process of being dismantled by a multi-pronged SNA offensive.
Therefore while I will include the brief overview I wrote regarding the offensive and its immediate ramifications below I plan on pausing the regular newsletter until the situation solidifies to some degree (I still owe you a write up of the events of the week and a half prior to the offensive). I am no military expert and much of what I cover with the newsletter are the political and economic developments within SIG and DAANES territory, reporting on which has largely paused over the past five days as everyone waits to see what happens. Feel free to ask questions or leave comments at the bottom.
Some topics not covered below include the role of Turkey in all of this, the question of what happens what HTS comes to rule over thousands of Christians and other non-Sunni Syrians in Aleppo and elsewhere, and the future of the SDF’s territorial possessions west of the Euphrates.
With regards to the former a theory that I find plausible is that Turkey green-lit the initial offensive but did not imagine the regime would crumble the way it has. Turkey (along with the other opposition backers) gave up on regime change in 2016 and while I don’t think it’s upset at the outcome it makes things very unpredictable in an already volatile regional context, which is not necessarily in Turkey’s interests. In the past day or so Turkey’s SNA proxies have focused their attention almost entirely on the SDF, reportedly with the assistance of Turkish artillery bombardment (which happens regularly regardless of military developments) though this appears to be a symptom of geography, the years of bad blood, and simply following the logic of the situation, then clear Turkish prodding.
As for the second question al-Jawlani has appeared quite cognizant of the public relations dimension throughout the operation, and the serious damage that repeated sectarian language and human rights abuses dealt the opposition internationally during the early years of the war. Additionally HTS has attempted to use the lessening of repression against the Christians and Druze of Idlib in recent years to gain international legitimacy, though this has not led to the removal of HTS from various terrorist lists. All that being said the situation is unprecedented and extremely dynamic at the moment so the future will only tell.
Finally, with regards to the SDF territories west of the Euphrates, as ongoing developments show, the al-Shahba’ pocket is in the most immediate danger and might not survive through tomorrow. Aleppo city’s Al-Sheikh Maqsoud has the benefit of being a dense urban environment, making defensive action easier than on the open plains of al-Shahba’. However it is now completely isolated from SDF or regime-controlled territory, making withdrawal negotiations with HTS likely. Manbij (and far away al-Tabqah) is less directly under threat due to its more remote eastern location, though this might change after HTS and the SNA consolidate control around Aleppo city.
A final question to consider is how the captured territory will be divvied up between HTS and its Syrian Salvation Government on the one hand and the SNA and the affiliated SIG on the other, or more specifically what territory captured post-Nov 27th HTS will allow the SIG to administer.
On November 27th the Idlib-based opposition, led by former al-Qa‘idah affiliate Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), launched a large scale offensive against regime positions in western Aleppo. The operation was given the name “Deterrence of Aggression” (Rad‘ al-‘Udwan), in reference to a recent increase in shelling and suicide drone attacks primarily striking targeting civilians in Idlib - the latter being a new trend that began at the start of 2024. In four days the success of the offensive has redrawn the map of northern Syria and has put the future of what has been a frozen conflict for the past four years into question.
While many different opposition factions are participating in Operation Rad‘ al-‘Udwan, it led by the Military Operations Administration (Idarat al-‘Amaliyat al-‘Askariyah) overseen by HTS commander Abu Muhammed al-Jawlani. This is clear in the operation’s media as well as the fact that HTS is (quasi-)sovereign actor within Idlib and has spent years purging opponents and consolidating control over the other factions. Apart from HTS the groups involved in the offensive include a mix of Idlib-based Islamist and relatively non-ideological groups, and foreign jihadist outfits such as the Uighur Turkistan Islamic Party and majority Uzbek Katibat al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad, in addition to deployments of various SNA factions such as al-Jabhah al-Shamiyah, al-Quwwah al-Mushtarikah, and Harakat al-Tahrir wa’l-Bina’.
The regime’s defensive line approximately 15km west of Aleppo city collapsed almost immediately, leading to rapid advances by the HTS-led forces. While it is too early to say it appears that the key reason for this rout is the redeployment of the Syrian government’s main allies outside of the theater. In 2016 it was a combination of Russian air power and Iranian-organized ground forces - including the IRGC and Lebanese Hizbullah, in addition to local Syrian and international Shi‘ah militias - that recaptured the opposition-held parts of Aleppo city and the surrounding countryside. While Russia’s deployment to Syria was always relatively light (primarily consisting of Aerospace Forces, special forces, and Wagner mercenaries) its invasion of Ukraine has diminished this further in some capacity. Meanwhile Iran and various Axis of Resistance militias have been preoccupied and to some degree weakened through its engagements with Israel over the past year. Without significant Iranian and Russian involvement, the Syrian Arab Army and allied militias present on the presumably undermanned western Aleppo front were unable to withstand well trained and equipped shock troops of HTS and its allies. By the nightfall of November 29th opposition forces entered Aleppo city unimpeded.
November 30th is when the ramifications of the offensive reverberated across Aleppo province and beyond. By the morning it was clear that the regime’s military and security apparatuses had largely disappeared from Aleppo city, with many officers and government officials reportedly fleeing south to al-Safirah and beyond. Thousands of civilians and military personal reportedly fled to the SDF-controlled neighborhood of al-Sheikh Maqsoud, in the city’s northeast, though it appears many stayed at home in part due to how rapidly the collapse occurred. This left the HTS-led opposition in control of almost all of Aleppo — Syria’s most populated city prior to the war - for the first time ever. Aleppo’s pre-war population of over two million was ten times bigger than that of al-Raqqah and twenty times bigger than that of Idlib, the only two provincial capitals ever captured by the opposition.
From there the operation branched out in several directions. Some moved to seize the towns north and northeast of Aleppo city including Kafr Hamrah, ‘Anadan, and Haritan, while other forces continued on other salient opened up in the previous days including moving south and east in the southern Aleppo countryside, as well as south along the Saraqib front in central Idlib. These advances moved unbelievably rapidly, seemingly facing little to no resistance. By nightfall of the 30th HTS-led forces were on the outskirts of Hama city, approximately 60km south of the closest pre-Nov 27th front lines.
Meanwhile the SDF responded to the dramatic developments by deploying forces west from Manbij and north from al-Raqqah into regime territory on Aleppo city’s southern and eastern outskirts. By midday November 30th the SDF was reportedly in control of the Aleppo International Airport, Deir Hafir in eastern Aleppo, and the Kurdish towns of Tell ‘Arn and Tell Hasil (controlled by the YPG in 2012-13 before in a Nusra/ISIS offensive) located between Aleppo and al-Safirah. It also appears the SDF connected its al-Shahba’ pocket of northern Aleppo with its al-Sheikh Maqsoud pocket, in addition to deploying forces to the al-Sheikh Najjar Industrial City northeast of Aleppo city. The SDF reportedly briefly moved troops into Nubl and al-Zahra’ after the all of the two towns Shi‘ah inhabitants reportedly fled, though these were quickly vacated and ended up in HTS hands.
These troop movements were likely done in communication with local regime forces though coordination would probably be the wrong word given the complete collapse of the military within Aleppo. While this connecting of the pockets harkens back to the SDF’s attempts to connect Afrin to Manbij circa 2016-17, in this instance it was more likely a contingent response to the changing circumstances. If the regime fully vacates Aleppo governorate and the SDF holds onto contiguous territory stretching from eastern Aleppo to al-Sheikh Maqsoud and Tell Rifa‘at this salient would be surrounded on one side by HTS and on the other by Turkey and the SNA, making it incredibly difficult to defend. Additionally the SDF’s attempts to create a contiguous entity back in 2016 took place prior to the launch of Turkey’s drone war, which further diminishes the viability of such.
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By the evening of November 30th HTS-led forces had gained control of the Aleppo airport though this appears to have happened peaceful, rather than through clashes with the SDF. Overall things have been rather quiet along the new lines of contact between HTS and SDF. Sporadic clashes have been reported and some opposition fighters have been killed or captured after wandering into SDF-controlled neighborhoods, however for the time being HTS seems to be consolidating control its new possessions while prioritizing its fight with the regime to the south.
At some point after midnight on November 30th SNA groups launched an offensive of their own along the al-Bab/Tadif front. This was given the name “Dawn of Freedom” (Fajr al-Hurriyah) and appears to be led by Furqat al-Sultan Murad, al-Quwwah al-Mushtarikah, and Harakat al-Tahrir wa’l Bina’, with other factions including Jaysh al-Islam partaking as well. After capturing the entirety of Tadif - a town split between opposition and regime control since 2017 - the offensive spread out to the south, west, and east, facing light resistance from the regime and possibly newly deployed SDF troops. By early evening SNA forces achieve what were presumably the operation’s initial objectives: seizing the Kuweires Military Airbase and cutting the Aleppo/al-Raqqah road. Later that night they reportedly gained control of Deir Hafir, held that morning by the SDF. By the afternoon SNA forces began launching attacks on the SDF’s al-Shahba’ pocket, focused its northern stretch south of al-‘Aziz and the areas around Tell al-Jijan, halfway in between Mare‘ and al-Bab….
