My 2024 forecast re: Turkish Syria policy via Turkey Recap
Following the 2016 coup attempt, Turkey's Syria policy has taken the form of direct military intervention aimed at (1) freezing the regime-opposition front lines to prevent a further influx of refugees, and (2) slowly destroying the political project of the local PKK-aligned PYD and its affiliated SDF militia.
While the latter has consisted of military offensives in the past, US and Russian opposition has curtailed additional operations since 2019. Since then, Turkey has transitioned to attacking the SDF from above: targeting military commanders, PKK cadres, and civilian activists in drone strikes while pulverizing key oil and gas facilities that keep the struggling local economy afloat.
Barring currently unforeseen events, this policy is unlikely to change in 2024. Erdoğan's domestic position remains strong: the political opposition is fractured following the 2023 elections, the military castrated, the PKK insurgency relegated to Iraqi Kurdistan. The Russian attempt at Syrian-Turkish reconciliation remains in a stalemate in part due to the likely possibility a Turkish military withdrawal would kickstart another refugee outflow.
And while the Biden-led US and Russia remain unlikely to green light future Turkish offensives, the current status quo of degrading the SDF's military and economic capacity through drone strikes remains comfortable for Erdoğan.
The changing responsibilities of Turkish military and security bodies post-2016 failed coup
Besides the ideational legitimacy, the failed coup attempt also allowed the ruling elites to restructure the entire security landscape, starting with, but certainly not limited to, the military. The failed coup attempt paved the way for unprecedented military purges on the suspicion of having links to Gülen. A series of reforms implemented shortly after radically restructured the TAF. The land, naval, and air forces were brought under the control of the Ministry of National Defense, stripping the TAF of its command role. Military high schools were also abolished, and officer cadres started to be recruited instead from civilian high schools including Islamic high schools (İmam Hatip). Military academies were replaced by the National Defense University, which is overseen by the Ministry of National Education. Similarly, military hospitals were put under the Ministry of Health’s administration.
Putting the TAF under civilian control was accompanied by further strengthening of other security organisations. The Gendarmerie and Coast Guards, which was effectively a branch of the armed forces, was brought under the MoI’s full control via an emergency decree, giving the Ministry an upper hand in domestic security. The aftermath of the failed coup attempt also witnessed the allocation of more heavy weaponry to the Turkish National Police (TNP) under the jurisdiction of the MoI. As a continuation of an already existing trend since the AKP’s rise to power, this meant not only the empowerment of the police, but also that the TNP would take on roles previously performed by the military. In fact, since 2016, the TNP has been the main actor in the war against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) inside Turkey.
The post-2016 period also saw further changes with the MİT being firmly placed at the centre of the security apparatus and given new capabilities and authorities to balance the TAF and the TNP. Already in 2014, an amendment to the Law on State and Intelligence Services led the MİT to assume operational tasks abroad, significantly expanding its access to documents and resources of other agencies and strengthening the criminal immunity enjoyed by its members. Later, at the end of 2016, changes drafted in the context of the country’s envisioned transition into a presidential system placed the organisation under the sole control of the president, expanded its influence among the different elements of the security apparatus, and provided it with foreign intelligence capabilities. At the opening ceremony in 2020 of the organisation’s new building, dubbed ‘the Fortress’ (Kale in Turkish), Erdoğan noted that the MİT “played an active role in Syria”, “significantly contributed to the successful execution of our [Turkey] military operations”, and “successfully executed duties in Libya”.
Ayyubid Raqqawi ceramics
I noticed these on a recent visit to the Met which offers a free PDF of Raqqa Revisited: Ceramics of Ayyubid Syria by Marilyn Jenkins-Madina, a book it published on the subject, via its website.
SyriaInBrief: Visual History of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria
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